What Fukushima tells us...

Rather than question the safety of nuclear power, we should strive to strengthen it. We must learn basic lessons from Fukushima. The impending energy crisis, the risks of climate change and the limited time we have in tiding over these threats cannot be lost track of.

The accident at Japan's Fukushima nuclear power plant as result of a tsunami seems to have made a heavier impact on the public mind all over the world than the tsunami itself. This calls for a deeper understanding of the perceived as well as real risks of nuclear power.

India is the fifth largest producer of electricity in the world after China, the US, Japan and Russia. However, in per capita terms, it ranks around 150. China is at the 80th rank, Russia 26th, Japan 19th and the US 11th. Annual per capita electricity consumption , a key index of development, is at around 650-700 kWh in India. This is less than half of the average in non-OECD countries, one-fourth the world average and 14 times less than the average in OECD countries. We need to decide what our target should be. In my view, 5,000 kWh appears a reasonable number. This is significantly better than the world average and about half the average in OECD countries.

At this level of per capita electricity consumption for a projected stabilised population in India of around 1.6 billion, we need to add to Indian grids electricity generation of around 40% of the present-day global output. To realise the same target, China needs only about half as much. Our coal reserves can support electricity supply at such a level for around 11 years. Our total hydro potential can provide for around 5% of the needed generation capacity. Other renewables excluding solar can support around 2%. Nuclear and solar energy are thus the only energy sources that can meet the challenge of our development. This does not mean less emphasis on other forms of energy generation. We need to make full use of all energy resources available to us.

Let us talk about solar first. We would need to earmark around 4.5 million hectares of area to be able to collect enough solar energy to meet our needs. This is roughly a fourth of the barren uncultivable land available in India. We, however, need aggressive development of this technology to make it cost competitive . Also, since the sun does not shine on a 24x7 basis, we need cost-competitive energy storage technologies. There are other areas of development of energy technologies for the future such as fusion energy.
We may well be at the oil peak around now. Our coal is likely to run out in around 40-50 years. Alternative energy supplies at the requisite level of use would need to be ready before this time. A severe energy crisis is likely to hit us much earlier than it does most of the world.

We should look at nuclear energy in this backdrop. It already provides 16% of world electricity in a cost-competitive manner. Despite Fukushima or the earlier Chernobyl, TMI and other accidents , real risks with nuclear energy are the lowest compared to various energy forms in commercial use. The advantage of nuclear would be even higher if one factors in the additional risks associated with the predicted consequences of climate change as a result of use of fossil fuels in a business-as-usual manner. Yet nuclear energy frightens us beyond all proportion.

According to a report of the United Nations Chernobyl forum expert group on 'health' published by the World Health Organisation in 2006, the Chernobyl accident caused 47 deaths till the year 2004 among firemen and severely exposed persons. From more than 4,000 thyroid cancer cases diagnosed in the 1992-2002 period, less than 1% died from this disease and the rest were treated successfully. We need to watch the situation further. An interesting point to note is that the effective dose as of year 2000 due to Chernobyl is already two and half times lower as compared to weapons fallout. We had Bhopal before Chernobyl when we suffered more than 3,500 fatalities. Yet Chernobyl remains a stronger image in our mind.

Fukushima so far has had no fatality caused by radiation. Seventeen workers have been exposed to doses in excess of 100 mSv, but that is lower than the permissible lifetime dose for occupational workers. There is radioactive contamination in the public domain, which will take quite some time to normalise. But the radiation dose received by people is unlikely to cause significant harm. The tsunami, which caused the accident at Fukushima, has taken more than 13,000 lives with more than 14,000 missing. Yet Fukushima seems to occupy much larger media space.

Seismically, the only region in India somewhat comparable to Japan is the Himalayan belt. As a matter of policy we do not locate a nuclear power station there. Epicentres that can potentially trigger a tsunami are around 10 times farther away in India's case as compared to Japan, which has not shut down reactors that are operable.

This is not to justify Fukushima . Such accidents are not acceptable . We must learn basic lessons from Fukushima and strengthen the safety of our nuclear activities without being complacent. We should also make rapid progress in bringing in advanced reactor systems such as AHWR with their greater degree of inherent safety. However, the impending energy crisis, the risks of climate change and the limited time we have in tiding over these threats cannot be lost track of. The tendency to read catastrophe into anything nuclear and allowing panic to grip us and deprive India from fulfilling its aspirations would be a self-defeating exercise.

Prevent IAS steel from becoming bamboo's

Is it possible to run a 21st century economy, galvanized by 22nd century ideas and social networks, with a 20th century bureaucracy , interpreting 19th century laws? One of the few institutions created by the British, which has survived the test of time in more ways than one, and yet had some notable failures is the Indian Administrative Service (IAS).
Despite prodigious reforms, the IAS has seen limited change. This is a cause for concern. The classic Westminster model, on which the IAS is founded, postulated that while politicians would debate and legislate policy, the civil service would execute it. This has, over the years, been turned on its head.

Politicians have found it profitable to get into every aspect of execution and indulge in rampant corruption, while the civil service is left to write something that passes off as policy. Add to this the increasing criminalization of civil servants' political masters and the influence of money power within the system. The IAS urgently needs reform if it is not to become increasingly irrelevant to development or be co-opted by the corrupt. 

What must be done? First, the IAS must not be a lifetime appointment . Initial appointment should be for 15 years. After that, every officer's performance should be evaluated by a constitutional authority such as the UPSC. The evaluation should be based on a 360-degree kind of appraisal, which is considered superior to traditional forms of assessment. Inputs should be sought from everyone - superiors, peers, subordinates and clients. The World Bank and the UK's bureaucracy successfully follow this system.

Those who do not make the grade after the evaluation and an interview should be 'put out to pasture' . They could stay on at the same level, pay and position for three years, after which the commission would evaluate them again. Alternately, they could collect a pension proportionate to their years of service and move on.

If the officer does make the grade, he can be hired through a competitive process on seven year contracts, with specific performance targets. For example, if a new airport needs to be designed and implemented, or if a Right to Food Act needs to be drafted, the respective ministries must advertise and recruit IAS officers competitively , based on their experience , aptitude and education. The terms of the contract should incentivize performance. Their accountability should be to the result , not just to the process. Further, they should be given the freedom to pick their own teams and to reward or punish them.

Second, there must be quick and visible punishment for deviant officers. The IAS, which mirrors Indian society, has its share of people who shoplift, are corrupt, access internet porn or harass people sexually. They must be punished and removed from the service after a fair and speedy trial. This will have a salutary effect on those who join the IAS for the wrong reasons. Recently, Himachal Pradesh removed two officers ; Tamil Nadu did so too a few years ago after they were convicted of corruption.
  
Third, promotions in the IAS continue to be based on a mix of seniority and merit and the latter is evaluated in a very subjective way. In an era of intense scrutiny by the media, CAG, CVC, CBI and the judiciary , the natural incentive for an honest officer is to shun initiative and try not to make decisions, to sign every file only after 20 others have signed it. In contrast, E Sreedharan broke with procedure to give Delhi a world-class Metro.

There are several CAG reports on his violations but had he not taken the initiative to violate procedure, the Metro would not have been completed in time and under budget . Unless the honest within the IAS are protected, unless the all-India conduct rules and their implementation become more nuanced and less mechanical, initiative will be stifled and officers will be prevented from leaving the system to learn modern tools, gather rich global experience and return. Officers will become frogs in the well rather than eagles in the sky.

In what is considered to be one of the most rigorous contests in the world, 500,000 of the brightest in India write a year-long , multistage examination, competing for just 80 seats in the IAS-half of which are reserved. The percentage of success is just 0.02%, roughly the same as the IIT entrance exam . Yet, something goes wrong and it needs to be urgently addressed . Countless IAS officers work selflessly every single day in difficult circumstances. I challenge any corporate CEO in India to report to a Mayawati or a Pappu Yadav rather than a Ratan Tata or a Narayana Murthy and still turn out a market-friendly performance . The IAS is merely one subsect of Indian society and reflects both the bright sparks and its problems.  

The half-life of justice and common sense

After one round of public scrutiny and an adverse order from the Supreme court, UCIL's plans for uranium mining in Nalgonda seemed to be defeated. But the company now proposes to continue down the same path, apparently unmindful of local opposition or legal strictures.

In early March last year, an environmental public hearing (EPH) was held on a proposed uranium milling and processing plant in an area inhabited by Lambada tribe, at Seripally village in Andhra's Nalgonda district. Uranium is a radioactive element used in missiles and nuclear weapons, and its dust is highly carcinogenic. The public hearing was required by law to obtain the clearances necessary for such projects. The inputs of interested groups were to be recorded at the meeting, and a decision made thereafter. But the very fact that this hearing was held showed how badly corrupted the whole process is.

To understand this, roll back the clock almost eight years. In August 2003, the Uranium Corporation of India Limited had held a similar meeting, to obtain clearances for uranium mines at Lambapur-Peddgattu, and a processing plant at Mallapuram. The status of this earlier public hearing and environmental clearances for uranium mining remains in limbo even after eight years. So what is different about the recent hearing? The Supreme Court has since ordered that no hazardous industry can be located within 10 kilometres of the drinking water sources for Hyderabad-Secunderabad, the water reservoirs at Gandhipet and Himayatsagar. Since the original site - Mallapuram - did not meet that standard, the UCIL is now proposing to establish the processing plant at Seripally, about 50 kilometers away.

But with clearances for the mining itself uncertain, what would be the point of obtaining clearances for a processing plant? It appears the Government has already taken a decision to go ahead with the uranium mining despite opposition by the local communities and various environmental and social groups.

The concerns raised about the uranium mining and the processing plant during the previous EPH in August 2003 were as follows 

• Nagarjuna Sagar water reservoir at risk of contamination: The proposed mines and processing plant are situated less than 2 kilometres from the Nagarjuna Sagar reservoir. The general drainage of the area from all sides is towards the reservoir. A study done by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency in 1982 on 22 uranium tailings piles near rivers or streams resulted in elevated levels of radium-226 and chemical contaminants . In November 1989, at Comeco's uranium mine (Canada), 2 million liters of radioactive liquid containing significant concentrations of arsenic and radium, spilled into a creek feeding Wollaston Lake . This massive spill went undetected for more than 16 hours, despite the fact that instrumentation and visits every two hours were in place to detect spills. These examples show that despite all the precautions claimed by the UCIL to contain the radioactive tailings, spills cannot be ruled out. The Nagarjuna Sagar reservoir provides drinking water for six districts of Andhra Pradesh, and any such spill will be catastrophic.
• Project's proximity to the wildlife area: The proposed leasehold area also comprises of the Yellapura Reserve Forest and is also very close to the Rajiv Gandhi Tiger Sanctuary. This sanctuary is very rich in fauna comprising of many scheduled species of mammals and reptiles, and about 200 species of birds.
• Only Rapid EIA (one season data) prepared for such a sensitive project: The EIA which was prepared for UCIL could not be called a full-fledged EIA report since only a single season's data was used in its preparation.
• No people's consent for diversion of forest land: The Central Government issued a circular in 1999 prohibiting the diversion of forest land in Sanctuaries, National Parks and Biosphere Reserves. In this respect, whenever any proposal for diversion of forest land is submitted, it should be accompanied by a resolution of the Aam Sabha of the Gram Panchayat/Local Body endorsing the proposal that the project is in the interest of people living in and around the proposed forest land .No resolution from Aam Sabha was sought by the UCIL with their proposal to seek the diversion of the forest land for non forest purpose to the State government.
• Public hearing venue selected in a way to keep people away from EPH: UCIL chose a venue for the public hearing that is 14 kilometres from the villages that would be affected. This limited the local people's ability to be present and voice their opinions at the hearing. 
  
  
  These concerns raised during the earlier public hearing are still lingering in the air, with no response either from the government or UCIL. Now, UCIL proposes to locate the processing plant farther from the reservoirs, but the mining itself would remain in the area near the water storage. The risk of contamination of the reservoirs, thus, is unchanged. Moreover, the radioactive material mined near the reservoir would have to be transported to the proposed processing plant, posing other risks of leakage along the way. Nor are the many other concerns addressed properly this time too. 
  
  
  
  

  The venue for the public hearing was once again far away from villages that would be affected. The site selected for the EPH was an open area in the midst of several small hillocks away from all villages and 'thandas' nearby, with inadequate and shabby arrangements, and it was inconvenient for many of the local people to reach the place. The Nallagonda APPCB regional office took great care to provide a heavily armed police force of about 200 at the EPH site, rather than providing basic amenities for the large number of men, women and their children attending the public hearing. The Environmental Impact Assessment prepared by M/s B S Envi-Tech (P) Ltd, Hyderabad a little-known group, is even worse than the earlier two EIA reports submitted in 2003 for the proposed Lambapur-Peddagattu mining projects and Ore processing plant at Mallapuram. This report too is based on data from just one season, and even that one is winter, whereas it is in the summer that the water flow and runoff that might contaminate water reservoir can be properly calculated. There is no information on rehabilitation and resettlement (R&R) for the project-affected persons, whose lands will be acquired, except the claim that 'Rehabilitation and resettlement package involved at the plant site and tailing pond area has been estimated as per existing norms.' Lest we forget, these existing norms have come in for scathing criticism in the Supreme Court only recently.   How will changing the site of the processing save the water reservoir from being contaminated, when the mining itself will be still done just 1.5 km away form the reservoir?  This uranium mining project was once rejected by the Government in 1996, on the basis of its close proximity to the wildlife sanctuary and its potential impact on flora and fauna. The project also ran into problems when the Andhra Pradesh Pollution Control Board on 28th January 2004 decided "not to consider" the Uranium Corporation of India Limited's proposal to set up uranium mining unit and processing plant at Lambapur/Peddagattu and Mallapuram villages respectively in Nalgonda district. The decision was taken at the meeting of the Consent for Establishment Committee (CFE) constituted by the Andhra government to sort out problems encountered by entrepreneurs setting up industrial units in the state. The CFE Committee decided not to consider the request for consent for UCIL at the proposed site saying that "this is impracticable and goes against the universally accepted precautionary principle." However, at same time a team consisting of Dr. Rajesh Gopal IGF & Director (Project Tiger) and Prof. Raman Sukumar (Indian Institute of Science in Bangalore) went for a site inspection on the 29th and 30th November, 2003, of Chitrial and Peddagattu areas of the Rajiv Gandhi Wildlife Sanctuary (Nagarjunasagar-Srisailiam Tiger Reserve). And in their presentation to the National Board of Wildlife on 8th January 2004, they proposed diversion of 1000 ha area in Chitral and 1000 ha in Peddagattu for the UCIL project from the wildlife sanctuary area. Their observation was based on the importance they attached to India's nuclear power programme and also the opinion that the proposed exploratory drilling may not cause any significant harm to wildlife and its habitat. The only condition they imposed was that the user agency should deposit Rs. 5 crores for better conservation, even as forest-dependent communities were being forced out of the forest areas in the name of protection. But this time for uranium project there is no opposition from either the AP Pollution Control Board or the state government. As of date there is no official communication from the government about their response to the public hearing. The Chief Minister, Y S Rajashekhar Reddy of the ruling Congress party, said the state government did not have any stake in the approval, and it was therefore for the Centre (also led by the Congress) to decide. Unofficial sources reveal that the Department of Atomic Energy put pressure on officials who were speaking against the project. The powers of the government under the Atomic Energy Act of 1964 are enough to go ahead with this project with or without the consent of the local people.  The Movement Against Uranium Project, comprising individual citizens and voluntary organisations, notes that at the end of the public hearing, despite the demand from the speakers and the public to announce the verdict of EPH Panel, the District Collector merely said that the minutes of the proceedings were recorded and that the entire session was video graphed and would be submitted to Pollution Control Board.   The troubling questions are too fundamental to be ignored. Why didn't UCIL engage a more qualified agency to conduct its EIA, based on scientific facts and data from many seasons, even years? How will changing the site of the processing save the water reservoir from being contaminated, when the mining itself will be still done just 1.5 km away form the reservoir? The UCIL's poor track record in Jadugoda has made people more suspicious of their activities. The question now is whether the Ministry of Environment and Forests, will give its clearance or reject the project on the grounds of environmental safety and stiff opposition from the people. This is an important test for not only the Government but also for the validity of whole EIA and public hearing process. The people of Nalgonda have made it very clear again and again to the government, the UCIL, and others that they will not let their land and forests be contaminated and destroyed by uranium mining. It's just not a question of their well-being, but the risks are also thrust upon future generations. Even if uranium mining is necessary, it has to be asked whether the nation's interest is served by putting approximately six million people in Hyderabad and Secundrabad at risk of a major drinking water contamination, in addition to putting local communities at constant risk of exposure to radiation.

  
  
  
  

NUCLEAR PLANTS - Nuclear safety: A poor record

Although as yet in India, there has not been a severe accident leading to core meltdown or large radiation exposures to the public, on measures of occupational exposure to workers, and compliance with standards for accident prevention, Indian nuclear plants perform poorly.

Nuclear reactors contain large amounts of radioactive material; this health hazard makes safety in nuclear facilities especially important. An examination of the safety record in India's nuclear facilities reveals poor practices and routine accidents, ranging from leaks of oil to complete loss of power in a reactor causing all safety systems to be disabled. For example in the 1980's, for which data is available, radiation exposures to power plant workers were ten times the world average for each unit of electricity and twice the world average for each monitored worker. As recently as in 2003, there have been accidents involving high radiation exposures to workers.

Despite this record, claims about safe operation are sometimes made by the nuclear establishments in India. Sometimes, claims for safety are based on the technical features of the facilities, which suggest a bright future. The following excerpt from the Nuclear Power Corporation of India (NPC), administered by the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE), is illustrative: "NPC engineers have shared their expertise internationally by participating in safety reviews and inspection of reactors in other countries conducted by the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). We are continuously updating our safety systems and procedures even at the cost of short-term economic benefit. Besides, all our plants are designed, constructed, commissioned, operated and maintained under the strict supervision of the AERB."

Notions of safety differ, but what they all have in common are usually claims about the future. In making the connection between the past record of anomalies and future prospects for safety, one must go beyond the mere presence or absence of accidents to study the factors present.

The 'engineering' approach to safety

To engineers, a safe reactor is usually one which is reliable, meaning that things can be expected to perform correctly most of the time. Safety is improved by incorporating backup systems to make overall operation more reliable, and protection systems to prevent the escalation of accidents. Ultimately, physical barriers protect the public from leakage of radioactive material. Backup devices and physical barriers together constitute "redundancy", so called because they are, in the engineers' judgement, not likely to be needed when the reactor is functioning properly but could become important as independent safety measures when something goes wrong. 

One problem with nuclear reactors is that components and subsystems often interact in unanticipated ways to cause accidents.  

In such an approach, it is indeed possible to make reactors operate safely but this depends on everything operating reliably. When the DAE claims that its reactors are designed to operate safely because of the different safety devices, one could immediately ask to what extent these devices are present and operating as they should be. Here, the record is not good. Safety systems have been inadequate in many facilities. For example, the two reactors at Tarapur shared emergency core cooling systems for a long time in violation of standards that required each reactor to have its own system. The reactors at Madras and Rajasthan had been operating for many years without high pressure core cooling systems, which would be needed if coolant is lost during an accident. The need for such systems has been known since the 1970's but the Madras reactors, built in the mid-1980's, were operating without them until 2004.

Often, backup equipment has been part of the design but unavailable during operation. For example, backup pumps for coolant circulation have on many occasions been unavailable when the operating pumps have been disabled by external factors such as fluctuations in the grid. Sometimes, even the minimum requirement of pumps has been unavailable, causing the reactors to be operated at reduced power. In an engineering approach, this record illustrates poor reliability of backup systems, suggesting that safety is also not as good as it could be. The above information about inoperative backup equipment is obtained from International Atomic Energy Agency reports of operating experience; the DAE is required to internationally report events which involve shutdown of the reactor. Secrecy in the nuclear programme means that problems surface only when an accident has occurred or the reactor has to be shut down. Therefore, the public record is only a weak test for reliability.

Are physical barriers good enough?

Ultimately, reactor designers rely on physical barriers to prevent harm to the public. In most reactors, there is a primary vessel that contains the fuel, radioactivity, and heat produced in the reaction. Outside there is a secondary containment building, meant as a physical barrier to prevent leakage of radioactive gases and material to the environment. Integrity of these barriers is often demonstrated through mathematical models up to a certain limit of pressure and temperature; during normal operation and under most accidents, these limits must be met. 

In some reactor types, there might be accidents for which it is difficult if not impossible to design barriers. For example fast reactors, one of which is being built in Kalpakkam, are vulnerable to a reactivity increase that could lead to explosive breakup of the fuel, leading to high energies that are difficult to physically contain. In fact, once the fuel becomes hot enough to melt, it is difficult to know what will happen next and the effectiveness of protective barriers cannot be guaranteed. Severe accidents apart, the effectiveness of these barriers also depends on their quality of design and construction. While the containment building was being constructed for the Kaiga reactor in Karnataka, its inner shell collapsed due to deficiencies in design. If this problem is widespread, it weakens the case for safety on the basis of 'defense-in-depth'. Unfortunately, until an accident happens and the barriers are tested, one might never know. And subsequently, attribution might be difficult.

Reliability in design and operations is necessary for safety, but it might not be enough. One problem with nuclear reactors is that components and subsystems often interact in unanticipated ways to cause accidents ('interactive complexity'). A classic example is the Three Mile Island accident, in which operators did not know the state of the reactor at the time and performed actions that actually worsened it. Redundancy could sometimes be part of the problem. For example in the Fermi fast breeder reactor in the United States, a safety device meant to catch the core in case it melted actually initiated a near meltdown when a part of it broke away and blocked the flow of coolant.

While such problems can often be fixed once they are identified, all such interactions might not be identified before they actually occur. There is plenty of evidence elsewhere of nuclear plant operators being surprised by unexpected interactions during accidents. While in some cases, accidents could have still been prevented if warning signs had been heeded, that is no consolation to the operators who are trying to fix the reactor as the accident is happening or the designers who are trying to build safe systems but cannot understand how things might go wrong. 

What makes an accident?

Multiple failures must occur at the same time for a severe accident to happen. This has happened in the past, for example in the Narora reactor in Uttar Pradesh in 1993. The accident happened when a fire spread through the cables and shut down all the safety systems and operators had to intervene manually to shut down the reactor. This might appear quite unusual, but the operating records reveal how the conditions leading up to the accident were always present.

The fire started when a poorly designed turbine experienced large vibrations and its blades broke away. Large vibrations in Indian turbines have happened before, but this was the first time that the blades broke and ruptured a pipe containing hydrogen, which then leaked and caught fire. Around the same time, oil was leaking in the turbine building. Oil leaks too are common in DAE's reactors, but this time the oil also caught fire. Fire spread through the power carrying cables and disabled them. Backup cables were present but had been placed in close proximity without being encased in fire retardant sheaths, in violation of international design guidelines. Therefore, they did not function effectively as backups. The accident was preventable, and the DAE had not learnt from best practices in cabling design, nor did it heed warnings from the turbine manufacturer about blade fatigue problems, especially significant in Indian reactors where excessive shaking of the turbines has occurred many times.

Nuclear reactors are tightly coupled, which means that there are few alternate pathways to diffuse accidents, which can often progress very quickly. To ensure safety, the appropriate interventions - whether by humans or automatic safety equipment - must occur quickly and be adequately planned for. This also requires a culture of reliability throughout the organisation. 

Our government's track record in scientific innovation is debatable, at the very best. Nuclear safety is paramount at a point when our energy security policy is tilting towards more reliance on this method of power generation. An independent (read, non-governmental) system of checks and monitoring has to be put in place to ensure the safety of people working and living in and around nuclear reactor complexes. Doesn't something like that exist already?  

Problems With Nuclear Energy
Early in 1995 a seminar on 'Nuclear Energy and Public Safety' was held in Delhi, co-sponsored by the India International Centre and some other organisations. A book, titled Nuclear Energy and Public Safety, edited by Dr. Vinod Gaur (incidentally one of the earliest members of the Indian Humanist Union) was published after the seminar, with contributions from about twenty eminent scientists, academicians and others. The picture that emerges from this is disturbing, as summed up in the Preface. Talking of "sloppy technology and management practices" it says: "The devastating fire at Narora, the major flooding of Kakrapara, and the collapse of the containment dome at Kaiga are recent examples of failures, details of which remain unavailable to the public, causing deep concern about the hazard potential of our nuclear installations. This situation supports a lax technological culture through immunity from public exposure at the expense of public anxiety , and clearly underlines the wisdom of creating public transparency of plans and designs and of hazards and failure analyses reports of large and crucial public utilities, as practiced by most democratic nations."

When the Report was published, the situation in nuclear-power generation was largely static worldwide. A number of accidents and incidents had led to widespread concerns regarding the hazards of nuclear power generation, and a slowdown – if not stoppage – in the building of new reactors. The Chernobyl disaster, the incidents at Three Mile Island and Windscale raised serious doubts about the viability of fission-based power generation. In the USA , "The accident was a watershed event for the US nuclear industry. Seventy-four plants under construction at the time of the accident have since been cancelled. Thirteen plants that were operating when the accident occurred have been permanently closed by their owners. Only fifty-three plants then under construction were completed and placed into service. No nuclear power plants have been ordered since the accident." The Bush administration had changed all that and heralded the Renaissance of Nuclear Power.

Efforts are being made to develop safer and more efficient reactor designs. An international task force has agreed on six nuclear reactor technologies for deployment between 2010 and 2030. All six are expected to yield advances in terms of sustainability, economics, reliability and safety. All these aspects involve highly complex as well as controversial technical considerations, and it would be presumptuous on my part to try to touch on these.

Here I shall try to confine myself to safety and security. In this context I believe it is important to make a distinction between safety and security; although the close relationship between the two must be borne in mind.

Safety Safety concerns safeguards against breakdowns, accidents arising out of negligence or mismanagement; and minimising the damage caused by natural disasters. In the case of nuclear energy the major areas of safety concerns are: mining, processing, reactor operations, spent fuel, waste management and decommissioning. Whether adequate safety can be ensured (in theory as well as in practice) in each of these areas has always been debated; but the issues are so highly technical that they are best left to the experts. It is probably true that for every expert there is an equal and opposite expert. This, of course, greatly helps in selective quotation.

On the subject of mining: "From the mining of uranium to the manufacturing of weapons and nuclear power, workers are faced with the risk of exposure to radiation. According to reports by the International Commission for Radiological Protection (ICRP), work-related deaths in uranium mines are estimated at between 5,500 deaths (for radiation workers @ 3 mSv) to 37, 500 deaths (for radiation workers @ 20 mSv) per million workers a year. This compared with deaths in the manufacturing industry (estimated at 110 deaths per year per million workers) and the construction industry (estimated at 164 deaths per million workers per year)".

On reactor safety: "Nuclear power plants are and will always be vulnerable to accidents resulting in meltdown or other large radiation releases due to human error and worn out or defective parts. Even without an accident or attack, nuclear power plants threaten public health by routinely releasing radiation into the air, soil and water. Moreover, U.S. nuclear power plants have a concerning record of violating safety regulations while regulators delay, deny, and defer to the financial interests of nuclear plant owners and operators. These failures increase the risk that nuclear reactors pose to the public." 
On waste management, "No technically or economically feasible methods have been proven for the ultimate disposal of radioactive waste; a grim legacy from the nuclear power program for future generations. Several proposals for dealing with the wastes exist and one or more of these approaches may eventually be shown to be satisfactory, but important questions remain unanswered today about all of them”.
Security
Security relates to protection from deliberately hostile actions such as sabotage, terrorist attack or attacks by missiles or bombs. Even if it is conceded that adequate safeguards can be instituted to prevent any catastrophic outcome in case of accident, negligence, mismanagement or natural disaster, vulnerability to enemy action still has to be taken into account - particularly for states like India, which live in a troubled neighbourhood. A successful attack on a nuclear plant can be incalculably catastrophic. In his landmark book on the subject: Nuclear Plants as Weapons for the Enemy: An Unrecognized Military Peril, Bennett Ramberg points out that any country that possesses nuclear energy facilities gives its adversaries a quasi- nuclear capability to use against it. A US Admiral is candid about this. "Once a war starts, the value system changes and anything you can do to hurt the adversary and cause him problems, you find justification for doing." He recalls hearing someone say, "You don't have to take the bang to the enemy; the bang is already there when you take out his nuclear plants." He was talking about the reported attack by the US on the Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center reactor in Iraq, just ten kilometers southeast of Baghdad. It was a small Russian-built research reactor. Nuclear plants, static and prominently visible, are ideal military targets. The world has more than 300 research reactors and almost 500 large nuclear power plants – all sitting ducks. Every nuclear plant is, in effect, a potential nuclear bomb embedded in our territory. It would be unrealistic to count on our nuclear facilities not being attacked in a warlike situation, or in terrorist operations. As Matin Zuberi says, "The core of a typical nuclear plant contains about 1,000 times the radioactivity released by the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. A high explosive bomb used against it would acquire the attributes of a nuclear weapon without its blast effect. According to an environmental impact statement of the U.S Nuclear Regulatory Commission a large truck bomb used against a nuclear reactor in a highly populated area could produce 130,000 deaths. An ordinary conventional explosive could thus be turned into a large radiological weapon. 
Within a nuclear power plant perhaps the most vulnerable part is the spent fuel pool. Spent fuel pools for boiling water reactors are located above ground. This can make these reactors even more vulnerable. Conventional explosives, by causing a breach in the pool water connections can cause a fire worse than even a reactor meltdown. As one report says, "If a fire were to break out at the Millstone Reactor Unit 3 spent fuel pond in Connecticut, it would result a three-fold increase in background exposures. This level triggers the NRC evacuation requirement and could render 29,000 square miles of land uninhabitable."

The nuclear power industry, with the support of the Bush administration, pushed for a revival of nuclear energy. The industry aggressively seeked to license and build the first new nuclear reactors in a generation. Toward this end, nuclear companies have sought public approval by disingenuously presenting the energy source as clean, renewable, and necessary to deal with global warming, environmental degradation, and dwindling petroleum resources. But nuclear energy is neither clean nor green. While nuclear reactors do release a smaller amount of greenhouse gases than their coal and natural gas counterparts, they create a significant amount of dangerous radioactive waste that remains toxic for hundreds of thousands of years. Beyond the health, safety, and security risks posed by nuclear generation of electricity-as well as its extremely high costs-this waste is a shameful legacy of our environmental exploitation that will beset generations to come.”

That the impediments in the way of India exercising the option to develop nuclear power-generation facilities are likely to be removed is certainly a cause for celebration, and represents the triumph of Indian diplomacy. That India is technologically ready to exercise this option does immense credit to India’s scientific establishment. But there seems to be a disquieting complacency, and surprising evasiveness or silence, on the issues of security and safety. Faced with the prospects of an energy famine, even environmentalists have changed sides. The stakes are incredibly high, permitting almost nil margin for error.

The major set back is due to inadequate Hazard Identification & Risk Assessment Process. Inadequate resources to conduct audits, inspection and training for the stake holders. Nuclear plants should go for HAZOP software to protect the facility and the people from loss and injury. They should allocate adequate budget to comply with rules regulations. Only compliance will save the industry from loss.

Having no job availability other than the nuclear establishment the DAE employees have been yearning that private sector will be ready to give a break for them from the personality oriented management practices of DAE establishment. It is rather pathetic in this country that Institutions like HOMI BHABHA NATIONAL INSTITUTE are propped up by the central government. This Institute of Higher(?) learning has more professors and associate professors than students. This closes down the only opportunity the DAE employees have to earn a decent research degree from reputed institutions like the IIT Mumbai or the Mumbai University. Disadvantaged at every stage the DAE employees are mostly forced to toe the line of that department or become spiritual accepting their fate.

DAE recruits always good manpower from the universities. But many get nowhere and it a sad story - an equivalent of intellectual genocide. "Are we in a democracy or some kind of autocracy?" is the question everybody knowledgeable in the nuclear field is asking. Once inside D A E most of the employees are in a fix ... not able to decide "to be or not to be scientific?" That is the real state of affairs. 

 

Nuking the public interest?

Atomic power is a perilous choice for Koodankulam, say "The Friends of the Earth" 

The southernmost tip of India is considered by Hindus to be one of the major holy places. The very southernmost tip of the subcontinent is known as Kanyakumari, and it is the only place in India from which the sun can be seen to rise in one ocean and set in the other ocean. Sometime last century, Swami Vivekananda went out to a large rock situated just off the southernmost extremity and meditated there for a number of years. It's a popular pligramage spot and an exceedingly pleasant place to contemplate life the universe and everything. Sunrise and sunset are magical.

The Indian Government has sought to site not one but two monster Russian nuclear reactors of the VVER1000/392 type, a very short distance away in the village of Koodankulam. The villagers in Koodankulam are poor fishermen; many of them have either been convinced that they may obtain jobs in the new reactor project, or have been intimidated into silence. However, opposition to the project is now growing. The Indian National Social Action Forum, (INSAF) the National Association of Peoples Movements, (NAPM) and Peace Trust have all sent letters protesting the project and pointing to safety problems with the VVER1000/392 reactor design, to the Prime Minister (whose portfolio includes the Department of Atomic Energy), to the Department of Atomic Energy, and to the Nuclear Power Corporation.

Note: The issue has been painstakingly agreed between Indian activists. It may not be absolutely perfect, but at this stage it isn't possible, in the interests of being fair to everyone, to alter it.

NUCLEAR SAFETY - What ails nuclear safety?

In-depth field studies in nuclear power plants worldwide have shown that they have common features that are essential for reliable operation. DAE's operations do not exhibit these characteristics. Instead, secrecy invoked in the name of national interest is the norm, leading to avoidable risks.

Accident theorists have suggested that the complexity of nuclear power plants makes it difficult to know beforehand everything that might go wrong to cause an accident, and furthermore that these accidents can spread quickly, making the attainment of safety difficult. However, there is a range of operational safety levels and some nuclear plants around the world have operated with relatively high levels of reliability. Organization theorists have studied what such high performing plants have in common, and during in-depth field studies in nuclear power plants they have found common features that they argue are essential for reliable operation.

Characteristics of high reliability operations

What they find is that in nuclear reactors operating at good levels of reliability, political elites and organization leaders place a high priority on safety in design and operations and operators have confidence in this fact. Furthermore, there is an atmosphere of openness and responsibility in which all individuals feel responsible for every detail of operations that they can observe, and feel free to point out their observations without fear. There are reliable backups in technical operations and in management of personnel, and this often prevents failures from escalating. At the same time, there is always a belief that present levels of safety are not enough, so that the guard is never let down. This means that such organizations are always exploring what could go wrong, and learning not only from their mistakes but also from others'.

In India, the Department of Atomic Energy's operations does not satisfy these characteristics. While detailed descriptions of what actually goes on inside India's nuclear facilities are not possible because of lack of access, there is some evidence about DAE's actions leading up to accidents and their response to them.

Lacking a culture of accountability
In 2003, there was an accident in the Kalpakkam Atomic Reprocessing Plant (KARP) that caused extremely high radiation exposures (280-420 mSv) to workers. The cause is said to be a valve failure, due to which highly radioactive waste entered a tank containing waste of lower radioactivity. At the time of the accident, about five years after the plant was commissioned, no monitors had been installed to check for radiation levels in that area. Neither were any mechanisms to detect the valve failure. Therefore workers had no way of knowing that the sample they went in to collect was actually emitting high levels of radiation. The accident was recognized only after a sample collected was taken to a different room and processed. 

Workers do not have control over their immediate environments, and problems cannot be raised openly in DAE\'s facilities.

The response of the management reveals a low priority to worker safety. Workers were also blamed for not wearing their thermo-luminescent badges. This is misdirected: the badges wouldn't have provided advance or immediate warning of radiation levels; rather they are meant to record total exposure over a period of time, to be calculated by another instrument. The absence of the badges reveals instead routine neglect of worker exposures. The management also blamed the workers for entering the room, despite the fact that workers were doing something that wouldn't have attracted comment if the valve hadn't failed. In addition, despite a safety committee's recommendation that the plant be shut down, the upper management of Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC), which oversees KARP, decided to continue operating the plant. Then the employees union wrote a letter to the director setting forth ten safety-related demands, including the appointment of full time safety officer. The letter also recounted two previous incidents where workers were exposed to high levels of radiation in the past two years, and how higher officials had cited emergency as a reason for not following safety procedures. Once again there was no response from the management.

Finally, some months later, when the union resorted to a strike the management transferred some of the key workers involved in the agitation and gave notice to others; this had the desired effect, and two days later all the striking workers joined back. The BARC Director's response was that "If the place was not safe, they would not have joined back".

Organization theorists point out that highly reliable operations are highly demanding and therefore precarious in systems that are structurally prone to accidents, because of the competing priorities and the difficulty of justifying efforts on safety whose direct outcomes are often unclear. But there is little effort on the part of the DAE, and there is low priority given to safety at the highest levels. Workers do not have control over their immediate environments, and problems cannot be raised openly in DAE's facilities. It is also not clear if the important lessons are learnt by the concerned organizations. Even after the leak at KARP was made public, the DAE continued to deny the causes of the problems and instead blamed the workers for a situation over which they had no control. 

The absence of independent regulation

Regardless of the DAE's claims that it operates under strict regulatory supervision, this is not so. The Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) reports to the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), which is headed by the secretary of the DAE. The Chairman of the Nuclear Power Corporation (NPC) is also a member of the AEC. Thus, both the DAE and the NPC exercise considerable administrative powers over the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board. In practice, this means that the AERB sometimes plays down the significance of accidents. For example, in March 1999, there was a leak of heavy water in the second unit of the MAPS reactor near Madras. The AERB dismissed the incident by saying that "the release to the environment is maintained well within the limits specified by the AERB." However, an independent scientist estimated that the radioactivity released to the environment was several times the permitted 300 curies per day per reactor and perhaps even exceeding the discharge limit of 10 times the daily quota, much higher than the AERB claims.

Too much secrecy

The lack of independent regulation is compounded by the difficulty in obtaining information about a program whose details are often shrouded in secrecy. Information about the accident at KARP in 2003 only became public when employee association members leaked information to the media after several unsuccessful attempts to have safety problems addressed by the management. M R Srinivasan, a former head of the DAE, has called upon the organisation to "adopt an enlightened policy of keeping the public informed at all times about safety aspects of its installations". But secrecy persists, and is often justified by the DAE using arguments such as national security. 

 Thus, when the AERB in 1995 submitted a report to the DAE on safety problems in Indian reactors and public-interest organizations filed a petition to obtain access to it, the head of the DAE filed an affidavit arguing that it should be kept under wraps, saying: "I say that the aforesaid document, prepared by the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board in November, 1995 which, among others, is a subject matter of this petition, is a document classified as Secret as it pertains to the nuclear installations in the country which include several sensitive facilities, carrying out activities of a highly classified nature, under the enabling provisions of the Atomic Energy Act, 1962. I respectfully say and submit to this Hon'ble Court that if this document (which was submitted to the Atomic Energy Commission and is classified as SECRET) is required to be published, then it will cause irreparable injury to the interests of the State and will be prejudicial to national security."

Such an argument doesn't stand up to scrutiny. The weapons potential of India's reactors can be inferred from the design details and the operating records submitted to the IAEA, all of which are publicly available. However, making such information public could weaken the DAE's own claims of safe operation and possibly fuel public concern about how its facilities are being operated.

Organization theorists often point to the importance of feedback and learning necessary to maintain high levels of reliability, especially in systems such as nuclear reactors where problems that can occur are not always known in advance. Openness therefore has instrumental benefits for the attainment of safety, and is also required if safe operations are to be demonstrated. On the contrary, the practice of secrecy in India makes it likely that problems are often kept under wraps until a mishap brings them to light. It also violates the right of affected communities to informed participation in the choices that, instead, are made on their behalf.

   

Nuclear Liability Bill: Who bears the brunt?

The nuclear liability bill by capping the liability arising out of a nuclear incident appears to be an effort to protect the nuclear industry at the cost of the fundamental rights of the citizens.

After the Bhopal gas tragedy judgment fiasco, all eyes are on the nuclear liability bill. The civil liability for nuclear damages bill is one the most contentious bills that is listed for consideration and passing in this monsoon session of Parliament. The bill has received a lot of criticism from the opposition parties and civil society on the ground that it has been introduced under US pressure.

Though the bill was approved by the Union Cabinet by November 2009, it could only be introduced at the end of the 2010 budget session. Due to an opposition walkout following its introduction, the bill was referred to the Standing Committee on Science and Technology, Environment and Forests. On June 24, the standing committee invited comments and suggestions on the bill from the public. The government is expecting the committee to come up with its report shortly following which the bill will be tabled in the parliament.

The nuclear liability bill is introduced by the central government with the stated object of fixing nuclear liability arising out of nuclear accident and for joining an appropriate international liability regime. The government (through Science and Technology minister Prithiviraj Chavan) has said that it wants India to enter the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC), 1997, so that supplementary funds are available. The idea to join the CSC itself was originally propounded by a committee set-up by the Vajpayee government.

The bill caps the total liability of any incident at a maximum of 300 million Special Drawing Rights (Rs.2100 crores). Of this amount, the liability of the nuclear operator is fixed at Rs.500 crores while the central government shall be liable for the rest of the amount upto the fixed limit.

Current liability framework

Though nuclear liability is not expressly provided for in any Indian law, right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution, has been interpreted to include within its ambit, the protection and preservation of environment from pollution. The Supreme Court in the Oleum Gas Leak case ruled that an enterprise which is engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous industry with the potential to cause widespread environmental damage, owes an absolute and non-delegable duty to the community to ensure that no harm results to anyone. 

The bill caps the total liability of any incident at a maximum of Rs.2100 crores. Of this amount, the liability of the nuclear operator is fixed at Rs.500 crores while the central government shall be liable for the rest of the amount.  

It held that in case of an accident, irrespective of negligence, the enterprise shall be strictly and absolutely liable to compensate all those who are affected. As nuclear enterprises deal with hazardous material which has the potential to cause widespread environmental damage, under the present legal scenario, it would be strictly liable to compensate all affected by a nuclear accident.

Another important environmental principle which has been recognised both in international law and domestic law is the polluter pays principle. This principle, adopted to further sustainable development, extends the liability of an enterprise not only to compensate the victims of pollution but also the cost of restoring the environmental degradation. In the Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action case, the Supreme Court applied this principle to hold that it is the polluting industry which will be liable for the damage it caused and not the government. Applying the polluter pays principle to nuclear liability, liability should lie exclusively with the nuclear enterprise and not the government.

On the topic of nuclear liability there are four major international conventions - the 1960 Paris Convention, the 1963 Vienna Convention, the 1997 Protocol to Amend Vienna Convention and the 1997 Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC). The CSC, which is still not in force, is only available to members of either the Paris or the Vienna conventions and countries that have enacted a domestic law in compliance with the law annexed to the CSC.

As India is not party to any of these conventions, it has to get a national law which complies with the provisions of the CSC annex for it to be a party to the CSC. The CSC does not require a limit in the liability and provides for supplementary compensation which would be provided through contributions from the different state-parties.

Major issues with the bill

The most contentious feature of the bill is that it caps the total liability of any nuclear incident at a maximum of 300 million Special Drawing Rights (around Rs.2100 crore at current conversion rate). Nuclear accidents are known to cause widespread damage to life and property. If the damage caused by the incident amounts to a larger amount, the compensation cannot be increased.

An absolute cap on liability violates the right to full compensation which, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, is part of the fundamental right to life. Though the claim is that capping liability is essential for entering the nuclear liability regime, the CSC does not have any such limit. In fact, the maximum liability which the bill proposes (300 million SDR) is actually the minimum liability amount prescribed by CSC annex. Also, if the total liability is capped, access to international funds provided by CSC may be blocked.

Out of the maximum amount, the operator of a nuclear plant shall be liable for Rs.500 crores. The central government will be liable for damages in excess of this upto the set limit of Rs.2100 crore rupees (300 million SDR). Fixing the amount of operator liability to Rs.500 crores is much lower than the terms of the CSC annex which states that the liability of the operator may be limited “to not less than” 300 million SDRs, or in cases where the state compensates the remaining loss, not less than 150 million SDRs, which is Rs.1100 crores. 

A less noted and discussed aspect of the bill is that the liability amount for the operator can be further decreased or increased by the central government as long as it does not go below Rs.100 crores. The rock bottom limit of Rs.100 crores has been allowed, following a similar proviso in the CSC's annex to cover post-incident cases where the government has evaluated risk and damages and has then decided to lower the liability cap.

Only 4 countries have ratified the CSC so far, and no country has a cap on the total liability of a nuclear incident. The US, a party to the CSC, has the a domestic liability law (Price-Anderson Act ) which provides for more than $10.5 billion (around 23 times India's limit) in liability from the private nuclear industry and the US Congress can decide to give more compensation if the amount is not sufficient.

By fixing the operator liability at such a low level, India's bill fails to provide sufficient incentive to the operator to prevent nuclear accidents. Moreover, the state’s liability for the balance can be seen as an indirect subsidy towards the nuclear industry and a burden on the taxpayer. By avoiding full compensation and making the government liable for the larger portion of the compensation, the bill violates the polluter pays principle applied by the Supreme Court. More worrying is the fact that the nuclear operator is not liable at all if the accident has occurred due to a grave natural disaster and in cases of terrorism and other armed conflicts. These exceptions violate the absolute liability rule laid down by the Supreme Court.

A crucial concern is that the bill restricts the victim of a nuclear accident from filing cases against the different players in the nuclear industry. The government is also accused of protecting the foreign nuclear suppliers by channeling all the liability to the nuclear operator, which under the present system is a state agency. However the bill gives the nuclear operator a right to sue the nuclear supplier/builder where it is expressly provided in a written contract and the nuclear incident was a result of a willful act or gross negligence of the supplier. 

Another issue is that the bill leaves the determination of the occurrence and gravity of a nuclear accident exclusively to the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) which is already entrusted with the task of regulation of nuclear plants. The worry is that the AERB may not work as a fully independent body as it was created by a government order and is answerable to the Atomic Energy Commission. The bill also ensures that all nuclear damage claims are only dealt by a Nuclear Damage Claims Commissioner or a Nuclear Damage Claims Commission. The bill denies a victim’s right to appeal against the decision of the Commissioner/Commission whose award “shall be final”.

Another problematic aspect of the bill, especially after the experience of the Bhopal gas tragedy, is that it fixes a limitation period of 10 years for filing cases. Damage from radioactive release, as the environment ministry pointed out, involves changes in DNA and hence takes a long time to manifest. By putting a short limitation period, people who acquire diseases long after the incident will not be allowed to sue.

Summing up

The nuclear liability bill presents a clear departure from the existing legal principles on liability applied by the Supreme Court. The rationale behind such an exception for the inherently hazardous nuclear industry is not clear. The premise that limiting liability is essential for joining an international convention like CSC does not have any merit as the convention does not require the state to limit the liability.

The rationale behind fixing the liability of the operators at a very low amount seems to be for allowing the nuclear operators to easily acquire the mandatory insurance cover required by the bill. With the passing of the Indo-US Nuclear Deal, private companies are expected to start its operations in India. The bill seems to be an effort to lure foreign enterprises to enter the nuclear industry to meet India’s enormous energy requirements. However, to achieve this, the bill has burdened the taxpayer and has restricted the right of victims protected by the Constitution.

As noted earlier, the Supreme Court has followed the polluter pays principle. Moreso, because the bill denies the right to full compensation which is a part of the fundamental right to life (Article 21), the bill in its current form, if passed, is likely to be struck down by the court if someone challenges it.

The World of Secrets

I don’t understand much of technology, but an innovative idea of art always excites me. I don’t understand why I should trade my normal cell for an iphone when all I need a phone is for talking. That is how techgnorant I am. However I get very excited when I come across a blog that is different,or a particular way something is sketched, or discover a certain book written differently. When I discovered Eve Ensler’s Vagina Monologues, I was amazed at the way the book was conceptualized, although I browsed the e-version. Last week something similar happened. I discovered a website called postsecret.com. Ever since, I have been hooked to it. As I read all of it, I wondered why I did not think of such an idea before. It is so very simple, yet so empowering.


Ever felt you are surrounded with secrets that haunt you? Secrets that you think no one should know, yet you are eager to share? Secrets of a hurtful childhood? Memories of the first kiss? Maybe the first time you did something mean to someone? Broke a flower vase? Harassed the neighbors? Stole something for fun? Did something otherwise considered taboo? Had voices in your head tell you something inappropriate? Wanted to say to your scatterbrained teacher what you thought of him/her? You get the point, right?

The idea is simple. Write down your secret in a postcard. Decorate it the way you want it to. Mail it to an address in Maryland, and it will get published. While you remain anonymous, your secret is out there for the world to read. The idea thrilled me. I made a mental note and came up with so many secrets I would want to share anonymously. Why do I hate this and this. Why do I like such and such thing. What do I think of you. What I don’t think of you. It’s so liberating and empowering, writing down your secret out in the open for you to read, and remain anonymous while the world reads it. It seems they have a couple of books published with people’s secrets in them. I immediately checked the book catalog at the library and got hold of their first book. It was more of a pictorial book with picture postcards and their secrets published. I could not put down the book till I finished it, homework and assignments be darned. I had finished the book in one evening. Ever since, I have been sniffing to get my hand on the other books.

I love that it is something so simple, yet so empowering and healing. I cannot tell about you, but I am definitely going to have fun reading others secrets. And no, I am still not telling you my secrets. But for the fact that I love listening to cheesy double entendre Bhojpuri songs while no one is looking.

The Last Drink

Apple with his four close friends, were performing their weekly ritual, meeting over drinks. Everyone was enjoying each others’ company.

After a few drinks all except Apple were down.

Apple wondered, whether he should be happy that he is awake and can still enjoy the drink or feel sad since he is alone to sip the last drink.

For those who haven’t fathomed the meaning out of this: drink is a metaphor for pleasures of life and sleep for death.