The half-life of justice and common sense

After one round of public scrutiny and an adverse order from the Supreme court, UCIL's plans for uranium mining in Nalgonda seemed to be defeated. But the company now proposes to continue down the same path, apparently unmindful of local opposition or legal strictures.

In early March last year, an environmental public hearing (EPH) was held on a proposed uranium milling and processing plant in an area inhabited by Lambada tribe, at Seripally village in Andhra's Nalgonda district. Uranium is a radioactive element used in missiles and nuclear weapons, and its dust is highly carcinogenic. The public hearing was required by law to obtain the clearances necessary for such projects. The inputs of interested groups were to be recorded at the meeting, and a decision made thereafter. But the very fact that this hearing was held showed how badly corrupted the whole process is.

To understand this, roll back the clock almost eight years. In August 2003, the Uranium Corporation of India Limited had held a similar meeting, to obtain clearances for uranium mines at Lambapur-Peddgattu, and a processing plant at Mallapuram. The status of this earlier public hearing and environmental clearances for uranium mining remains in limbo even after eight years. So what is different about the recent hearing? The Supreme Court has since ordered that no hazardous industry can be located within 10 kilometres of the drinking water sources for Hyderabad-Secunderabad, the water reservoirs at Gandhipet and Himayatsagar. Since the original site - Mallapuram - did not meet that standard, the UCIL is now proposing to establish the processing plant at Seripally, about 50 kilometers away.

But with clearances for the mining itself uncertain, what would be the point of obtaining clearances for a processing plant? It appears the Government has already taken a decision to go ahead with the uranium mining despite opposition by the local communities and various environmental and social groups.

The concerns raised about the uranium mining and the processing plant during the previous EPH in August 2003 were as follows 

• Nagarjuna Sagar water reservoir at risk of contamination: The proposed mines and processing plant are situated less than 2 kilometres from the Nagarjuna Sagar reservoir. The general drainage of the area from all sides is towards the reservoir. A study done by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency in 1982 on 22 uranium tailings piles near rivers or streams resulted in elevated levels of radium-226 and chemical contaminants . In November 1989, at Comeco's uranium mine (Canada), 2 million liters of radioactive liquid containing significant concentrations of arsenic and radium, spilled into a creek feeding Wollaston Lake . This massive spill went undetected for more than 16 hours, despite the fact that instrumentation and visits every two hours were in place to detect spills. These examples show that despite all the precautions claimed by the UCIL to contain the radioactive tailings, spills cannot be ruled out. The Nagarjuna Sagar reservoir provides drinking water for six districts of Andhra Pradesh, and any such spill will be catastrophic.
• Project's proximity to the wildlife area: The proposed leasehold area also comprises of the Yellapura Reserve Forest and is also very close to the Rajiv Gandhi Tiger Sanctuary. This sanctuary is very rich in fauna comprising of many scheduled species of mammals and reptiles, and about 200 species of birds.
• Only Rapid EIA (one season data) prepared for such a sensitive project: The EIA which was prepared for UCIL could not be called a full-fledged EIA report since only a single season's data was used in its preparation.
• No people's consent for diversion of forest land: The Central Government issued a circular in 1999 prohibiting the diversion of forest land in Sanctuaries, National Parks and Biosphere Reserves. In this respect, whenever any proposal for diversion of forest land is submitted, it should be accompanied by a resolution of the Aam Sabha of the Gram Panchayat/Local Body endorsing the proposal that the project is in the interest of people living in and around the proposed forest land .No resolution from Aam Sabha was sought by the UCIL with their proposal to seek the diversion of the forest land for non forest purpose to the State government.
• Public hearing venue selected in a way to keep people away from EPH: UCIL chose a venue for the public hearing that is 14 kilometres from the villages that would be affected. This limited the local people's ability to be present and voice their opinions at the hearing. 
  
  
  These concerns raised during the earlier public hearing are still lingering in the air, with no response either from the government or UCIL. Now, UCIL proposes to locate the processing plant farther from the reservoirs, but the mining itself would remain in the area near the water storage. The risk of contamination of the reservoirs, thus, is unchanged. Moreover, the radioactive material mined near the reservoir would have to be transported to the proposed processing plant, posing other risks of leakage along the way. Nor are the many other concerns addressed properly this time too. 
  
  
  
  

  The venue for the public hearing was once again far away from villages that would be affected. The site selected for the EPH was an open area in the midst of several small hillocks away from all villages and 'thandas' nearby, with inadequate and shabby arrangements, and it was inconvenient for many of the local people to reach the place. The Nallagonda APPCB regional office took great care to provide a heavily armed police force of about 200 at the EPH site, rather than providing basic amenities for the large number of men, women and their children attending the public hearing. The Environmental Impact Assessment prepared by M/s B S Envi-Tech (P) Ltd, Hyderabad a little-known group, is even worse than the earlier two EIA reports submitted in 2003 for the proposed Lambapur-Peddagattu mining projects and Ore processing plant at Mallapuram. This report too is based on data from just one season, and even that one is winter, whereas it is in the summer that the water flow and runoff that might contaminate water reservoir can be properly calculated. There is no information on rehabilitation and resettlement (R&R) for the project-affected persons, whose lands will be acquired, except the claim that 'Rehabilitation and resettlement package involved at the plant site and tailing pond area has been estimated as per existing norms.' Lest we forget, these existing norms have come in for scathing criticism in the Supreme Court only recently.   How will changing the site of the processing save the water reservoir from being contaminated, when the mining itself will be still done just 1.5 km away form the reservoir?  This uranium mining project was once rejected by the Government in 1996, on the basis of its close proximity to the wildlife sanctuary and its potential impact on flora and fauna. The project also ran into problems when the Andhra Pradesh Pollution Control Board on 28th January 2004 decided "not to consider" the Uranium Corporation of India Limited's proposal to set up uranium mining unit and processing plant at Lambapur/Peddagattu and Mallapuram villages respectively in Nalgonda district. The decision was taken at the meeting of the Consent for Establishment Committee (CFE) constituted by the Andhra government to sort out problems encountered by entrepreneurs setting up industrial units in the state. The CFE Committee decided not to consider the request for consent for UCIL at the proposed site saying that "this is impracticable and goes against the universally accepted precautionary principle." However, at same time a team consisting of Dr. Rajesh Gopal IGF & Director (Project Tiger) and Prof. Raman Sukumar (Indian Institute of Science in Bangalore) went for a site inspection on the 29th and 30th November, 2003, of Chitrial and Peddagattu areas of the Rajiv Gandhi Wildlife Sanctuary (Nagarjunasagar-Srisailiam Tiger Reserve). And in their presentation to the National Board of Wildlife on 8th January 2004, they proposed diversion of 1000 ha area in Chitral and 1000 ha in Peddagattu for the UCIL project from the wildlife sanctuary area. Their observation was based on the importance they attached to India's nuclear power programme and also the opinion that the proposed exploratory drilling may not cause any significant harm to wildlife and its habitat. The only condition they imposed was that the user agency should deposit Rs. 5 crores for better conservation, even as forest-dependent communities were being forced out of the forest areas in the name of protection. But this time for uranium project there is no opposition from either the AP Pollution Control Board or the state government. As of date there is no official communication from the government about their response to the public hearing. The Chief Minister, Y S Rajashekhar Reddy of the ruling Congress party, said the state government did not have any stake in the approval, and it was therefore for the Centre (also led by the Congress) to decide. Unofficial sources reveal that the Department of Atomic Energy put pressure on officials who were speaking against the project. The powers of the government under the Atomic Energy Act of 1964 are enough to go ahead with this project with or without the consent of the local people.  The Movement Against Uranium Project, comprising individual citizens and voluntary organisations, notes that at the end of the public hearing, despite the demand from the speakers and the public to announce the verdict of EPH Panel, the District Collector merely said that the minutes of the proceedings were recorded and that the entire session was video graphed and would be submitted to Pollution Control Board.   The troubling questions are too fundamental to be ignored. Why didn't UCIL engage a more qualified agency to conduct its EIA, based on scientific facts and data from many seasons, even years? How will changing the site of the processing save the water reservoir from being contaminated, when the mining itself will be still done just 1.5 km away form the reservoir? The UCIL's poor track record in Jadugoda has made people more suspicious of their activities. The question now is whether the Ministry of Environment and Forests, will give its clearance or reject the project on the grounds of environmental safety and stiff opposition from the people. This is an important test for not only the Government but also for the validity of whole EIA and public hearing process. The people of Nalgonda have made it very clear again and again to the government, the UCIL, and others that they will not let their land and forests be contaminated and destroyed by uranium mining. It's just not a question of their well-being, but the risks are also thrust upon future generations. Even if uranium mining is necessary, it has to be asked whether the nation's interest is served by putting approximately six million people in Hyderabad and Secundrabad at risk of a major drinking water contamination, in addition to putting local communities at constant risk of exposure to radiation.

  
  
  
  

NUCLEAR PLANTS - Nuclear safety: A poor record

Although as yet in India, there has not been a severe accident leading to core meltdown or large radiation exposures to the public, on measures of occupational exposure to workers, and compliance with standards for accident prevention, Indian nuclear plants perform poorly.

Nuclear reactors contain large amounts of radioactive material; this health hazard makes safety in nuclear facilities especially important. An examination of the safety record in India's nuclear facilities reveals poor practices and routine accidents, ranging from leaks of oil to complete loss of power in a reactor causing all safety systems to be disabled. For example in the 1980's, for which data is available, radiation exposures to power plant workers were ten times the world average for each unit of electricity and twice the world average for each monitored worker. As recently as in 2003, there have been accidents involving high radiation exposures to workers.

Despite this record, claims about safe operation are sometimes made by the nuclear establishments in India. Sometimes, claims for safety are based on the technical features of the facilities, which suggest a bright future. The following excerpt from the Nuclear Power Corporation of India (NPC), administered by the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE), is illustrative: "NPC engineers have shared their expertise internationally by participating in safety reviews and inspection of reactors in other countries conducted by the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). We are continuously updating our safety systems and procedures even at the cost of short-term economic benefit. Besides, all our plants are designed, constructed, commissioned, operated and maintained under the strict supervision of the AERB."

Notions of safety differ, but what they all have in common are usually claims about the future. In making the connection between the past record of anomalies and future prospects for safety, one must go beyond the mere presence or absence of accidents to study the factors present.

The 'engineering' approach to safety

To engineers, a safe reactor is usually one which is reliable, meaning that things can be expected to perform correctly most of the time. Safety is improved by incorporating backup systems to make overall operation more reliable, and protection systems to prevent the escalation of accidents. Ultimately, physical barriers protect the public from leakage of radioactive material. Backup devices and physical barriers together constitute "redundancy", so called because they are, in the engineers' judgement, not likely to be needed when the reactor is functioning properly but could become important as independent safety measures when something goes wrong. 

One problem with nuclear reactors is that components and subsystems often interact in unanticipated ways to cause accidents.  

In such an approach, it is indeed possible to make reactors operate safely but this depends on everything operating reliably. When the DAE claims that its reactors are designed to operate safely because of the different safety devices, one could immediately ask to what extent these devices are present and operating as they should be. Here, the record is not good. Safety systems have been inadequate in many facilities. For example, the two reactors at Tarapur shared emergency core cooling systems for a long time in violation of standards that required each reactor to have its own system. The reactors at Madras and Rajasthan had been operating for many years without high pressure core cooling systems, which would be needed if coolant is lost during an accident. The need for such systems has been known since the 1970's but the Madras reactors, built in the mid-1980's, were operating without them until 2004.

Often, backup equipment has been part of the design but unavailable during operation. For example, backup pumps for coolant circulation have on many occasions been unavailable when the operating pumps have been disabled by external factors such as fluctuations in the grid. Sometimes, even the minimum requirement of pumps has been unavailable, causing the reactors to be operated at reduced power. In an engineering approach, this record illustrates poor reliability of backup systems, suggesting that safety is also not as good as it could be. The above information about inoperative backup equipment is obtained from International Atomic Energy Agency reports of operating experience; the DAE is required to internationally report events which involve shutdown of the reactor. Secrecy in the nuclear programme means that problems surface only when an accident has occurred or the reactor has to be shut down. Therefore, the public record is only a weak test for reliability.

Are physical barriers good enough?

Ultimately, reactor designers rely on physical barriers to prevent harm to the public. In most reactors, there is a primary vessel that contains the fuel, radioactivity, and heat produced in the reaction. Outside there is a secondary containment building, meant as a physical barrier to prevent leakage of radioactive gases and material to the environment. Integrity of these barriers is often demonstrated through mathematical models up to a certain limit of pressure and temperature; during normal operation and under most accidents, these limits must be met. 

In some reactor types, there might be accidents for which it is difficult if not impossible to design barriers. For example fast reactors, one of which is being built in Kalpakkam, are vulnerable to a reactivity increase that could lead to explosive breakup of the fuel, leading to high energies that are difficult to physically contain. In fact, once the fuel becomes hot enough to melt, it is difficult to know what will happen next and the effectiveness of protective barriers cannot be guaranteed. Severe accidents apart, the effectiveness of these barriers also depends on their quality of design and construction. While the containment building was being constructed for the Kaiga reactor in Karnataka, its inner shell collapsed due to deficiencies in design. If this problem is widespread, it weakens the case for safety on the basis of 'defense-in-depth'. Unfortunately, until an accident happens and the barriers are tested, one might never know. And subsequently, attribution might be difficult.

Reliability in design and operations is necessary for safety, but it might not be enough. One problem with nuclear reactors is that components and subsystems often interact in unanticipated ways to cause accidents ('interactive complexity'). A classic example is the Three Mile Island accident, in which operators did not know the state of the reactor at the time and performed actions that actually worsened it. Redundancy could sometimes be part of the problem. For example in the Fermi fast breeder reactor in the United States, a safety device meant to catch the core in case it melted actually initiated a near meltdown when a part of it broke away and blocked the flow of coolant.

While such problems can often be fixed once they are identified, all such interactions might not be identified before they actually occur. There is plenty of evidence elsewhere of nuclear plant operators being surprised by unexpected interactions during accidents. While in some cases, accidents could have still been prevented if warning signs had been heeded, that is no consolation to the operators who are trying to fix the reactor as the accident is happening or the designers who are trying to build safe systems but cannot understand how things might go wrong. 

What makes an accident?

Multiple failures must occur at the same time for a severe accident to happen. This has happened in the past, for example in the Narora reactor in Uttar Pradesh in 1993. The accident happened when a fire spread through the cables and shut down all the safety systems and operators had to intervene manually to shut down the reactor. This might appear quite unusual, but the operating records reveal how the conditions leading up to the accident were always present.

The fire started when a poorly designed turbine experienced large vibrations and its blades broke away. Large vibrations in Indian turbines have happened before, but this was the first time that the blades broke and ruptured a pipe containing hydrogen, which then leaked and caught fire. Around the same time, oil was leaking in the turbine building. Oil leaks too are common in DAE's reactors, but this time the oil also caught fire. Fire spread through the power carrying cables and disabled them. Backup cables were present but had been placed in close proximity without being encased in fire retardant sheaths, in violation of international design guidelines. Therefore, they did not function effectively as backups. The accident was preventable, and the DAE had not learnt from best practices in cabling design, nor did it heed warnings from the turbine manufacturer about blade fatigue problems, especially significant in Indian reactors where excessive shaking of the turbines has occurred many times.

Nuclear reactors are tightly coupled, which means that there are few alternate pathways to diffuse accidents, which can often progress very quickly. To ensure safety, the appropriate interventions - whether by humans or automatic safety equipment - must occur quickly and be adequately planned for. This also requires a culture of reliability throughout the organisation. 

Our government's track record in scientific innovation is debatable, at the very best. Nuclear safety is paramount at a point when our energy security policy is tilting towards more reliance on this method of power generation. An independent (read, non-governmental) system of checks and monitoring has to be put in place to ensure the safety of people working and living in and around nuclear reactor complexes. Doesn't something like that exist already?  

Problems With Nuclear Energy
Early in 1995 a seminar on 'Nuclear Energy and Public Safety' was held in Delhi, co-sponsored by the India International Centre and some other organisations. A book, titled Nuclear Energy and Public Safety, edited by Dr. Vinod Gaur (incidentally one of the earliest members of the Indian Humanist Union) was published after the seminar, with contributions from about twenty eminent scientists, academicians and others. The picture that emerges from this is disturbing, as summed up in the Preface. Talking of "sloppy technology and management practices" it says: "The devastating fire at Narora, the major flooding of Kakrapara, and the collapse of the containment dome at Kaiga are recent examples of failures, details of which remain unavailable to the public, causing deep concern about the hazard potential of our nuclear installations. This situation supports a lax technological culture through immunity from public exposure at the expense of public anxiety , and clearly underlines the wisdom of creating public transparency of plans and designs and of hazards and failure analyses reports of large and crucial public utilities, as practiced by most democratic nations."

When the Report was published, the situation in nuclear-power generation was largely static worldwide. A number of accidents and incidents had led to widespread concerns regarding the hazards of nuclear power generation, and a slowdown – if not stoppage – in the building of new reactors. The Chernobyl disaster, the incidents at Three Mile Island and Windscale raised serious doubts about the viability of fission-based power generation. In the USA , "The accident was a watershed event for the US nuclear industry. Seventy-four plants under construction at the time of the accident have since been cancelled. Thirteen plants that were operating when the accident occurred have been permanently closed by their owners. Only fifty-three plants then under construction were completed and placed into service. No nuclear power plants have been ordered since the accident." The Bush administration had changed all that and heralded the Renaissance of Nuclear Power.

Efforts are being made to develop safer and more efficient reactor designs. An international task force has agreed on six nuclear reactor technologies for deployment between 2010 and 2030. All six are expected to yield advances in terms of sustainability, economics, reliability and safety. All these aspects involve highly complex as well as controversial technical considerations, and it would be presumptuous on my part to try to touch on these.

Here I shall try to confine myself to safety and security. In this context I believe it is important to make a distinction between safety and security; although the close relationship between the two must be borne in mind.

Safety Safety concerns safeguards against breakdowns, accidents arising out of negligence or mismanagement; and minimising the damage caused by natural disasters. In the case of nuclear energy the major areas of safety concerns are: mining, processing, reactor operations, spent fuel, waste management and decommissioning. Whether adequate safety can be ensured (in theory as well as in practice) in each of these areas has always been debated; but the issues are so highly technical that they are best left to the experts. It is probably true that for every expert there is an equal and opposite expert. This, of course, greatly helps in selective quotation.

On the subject of mining: "From the mining of uranium to the manufacturing of weapons and nuclear power, workers are faced with the risk of exposure to radiation. According to reports by the International Commission for Radiological Protection (ICRP), work-related deaths in uranium mines are estimated at between 5,500 deaths (for radiation workers @ 3 mSv) to 37, 500 deaths (for radiation workers @ 20 mSv) per million workers a year. This compared with deaths in the manufacturing industry (estimated at 110 deaths per year per million workers) and the construction industry (estimated at 164 deaths per million workers per year)".

On reactor safety: "Nuclear power plants are and will always be vulnerable to accidents resulting in meltdown or other large radiation releases due to human error and worn out or defective parts. Even without an accident or attack, nuclear power plants threaten public health by routinely releasing radiation into the air, soil and water. Moreover, U.S. nuclear power plants have a concerning record of violating safety regulations while regulators delay, deny, and defer to the financial interests of nuclear plant owners and operators. These failures increase the risk that nuclear reactors pose to the public." 
On waste management, "No technically or economically feasible methods have been proven for the ultimate disposal of radioactive waste; a grim legacy from the nuclear power program for future generations. Several proposals for dealing with the wastes exist and one or more of these approaches may eventually be shown to be satisfactory, but important questions remain unanswered today about all of them”.
Security
Security relates to protection from deliberately hostile actions such as sabotage, terrorist attack or attacks by missiles or bombs. Even if it is conceded that adequate safeguards can be instituted to prevent any catastrophic outcome in case of accident, negligence, mismanagement or natural disaster, vulnerability to enemy action still has to be taken into account - particularly for states like India, which live in a troubled neighbourhood. A successful attack on a nuclear plant can be incalculably catastrophic. In his landmark book on the subject: Nuclear Plants as Weapons for the Enemy: An Unrecognized Military Peril, Bennett Ramberg points out that any country that possesses nuclear energy facilities gives its adversaries a quasi- nuclear capability to use against it. A US Admiral is candid about this. "Once a war starts, the value system changes and anything you can do to hurt the adversary and cause him problems, you find justification for doing." He recalls hearing someone say, "You don't have to take the bang to the enemy; the bang is already there when you take out his nuclear plants." He was talking about the reported attack by the US on the Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center reactor in Iraq, just ten kilometers southeast of Baghdad. It was a small Russian-built research reactor. Nuclear plants, static and prominently visible, are ideal military targets. The world has more than 300 research reactors and almost 500 large nuclear power plants – all sitting ducks. Every nuclear plant is, in effect, a potential nuclear bomb embedded in our territory. It would be unrealistic to count on our nuclear facilities not being attacked in a warlike situation, or in terrorist operations. As Matin Zuberi says, "The core of a typical nuclear plant contains about 1,000 times the radioactivity released by the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. A high explosive bomb used against it would acquire the attributes of a nuclear weapon without its blast effect. According to an environmental impact statement of the U.S Nuclear Regulatory Commission a large truck bomb used against a nuclear reactor in a highly populated area could produce 130,000 deaths. An ordinary conventional explosive could thus be turned into a large radiological weapon. 
Within a nuclear power plant perhaps the most vulnerable part is the spent fuel pool. Spent fuel pools for boiling water reactors are located above ground. This can make these reactors even more vulnerable. Conventional explosives, by causing a breach in the pool water connections can cause a fire worse than even a reactor meltdown. As one report says, "If a fire were to break out at the Millstone Reactor Unit 3 spent fuel pond in Connecticut, it would result a three-fold increase in background exposures. This level triggers the NRC evacuation requirement and could render 29,000 square miles of land uninhabitable."

The nuclear power industry, with the support of the Bush administration, pushed for a revival of nuclear energy. The industry aggressively seeked to license and build the first new nuclear reactors in a generation. Toward this end, nuclear companies have sought public approval by disingenuously presenting the energy source as clean, renewable, and necessary to deal with global warming, environmental degradation, and dwindling petroleum resources. But nuclear energy is neither clean nor green. While nuclear reactors do release a smaller amount of greenhouse gases than their coal and natural gas counterparts, they create a significant amount of dangerous radioactive waste that remains toxic for hundreds of thousands of years. Beyond the health, safety, and security risks posed by nuclear generation of electricity-as well as its extremely high costs-this waste is a shameful legacy of our environmental exploitation that will beset generations to come.”

That the impediments in the way of India exercising the option to develop nuclear power-generation facilities are likely to be removed is certainly a cause for celebration, and represents the triumph of Indian diplomacy. That India is technologically ready to exercise this option does immense credit to India’s scientific establishment. But there seems to be a disquieting complacency, and surprising evasiveness or silence, on the issues of security and safety. Faced with the prospects of an energy famine, even environmentalists have changed sides. The stakes are incredibly high, permitting almost nil margin for error.

The major set back is due to inadequate Hazard Identification & Risk Assessment Process. Inadequate resources to conduct audits, inspection and training for the stake holders. Nuclear plants should go for HAZOP software to protect the facility and the people from loss and injury. They should allocate adequate budget to comply with rules regulations. Only compliance will save the industry from loss.

Having no job availability other than the nuclear establishment the DAE employees have been yearning that private sector will be ready to give a break for them from the personality oriented management practices of DAE establishment. It is rather pathetic in this country that Institutions like HOMI BHABHA NATIONAL INSTITUTE are propped up by the central government. This Institute of Higher(?) learning has more professors and associate professors than students. This closes down the only opportunity the DAE employees have to earn a decent research degree from reputed institutions like the IIT Mumbai or the Mumbai University. Disadvantaged at every stage the DAE employees are mostly forced to toe the line of that department or become spiritual accepting their fate.

DAE recruits always good manpower from the universities. But many get nowhere and it a sad story - an equivalent of intellectual genocide. "Are we in a democracy or some kind of autocracy?" is the question everybody knowledgeable in the nuclear field is asking. Once inside D A E most of the employees are in a fix ... not able to decide "to be or not to be scientific?" That is the real state of affairs. 

 

Nuking the public interest?

Atomic power is a perilous choice for Koodankulam, say "The Friends of the Earth" 

The southernmost tip of India is considered by Hindus to be one of the major holy places. The very southernmost tip of the subcontinent is known as Kanyakumari, and it is the only place in India from which the sun can be seen to rise in one ocean and set in the other ocean. Sometime last century, Swami Vivekananda went out to a large rock situated just off the southernmost extremity and meditated there for a number of years. It's a popular pligramage spot and an exceedingly pleasant place to contemplate life the universe and everything. Sunrise and sunset are magical.

The Indian Government has sought to site not one but two monster Russian nuclear reactors of the VVER1000/392 type, a very short distance away in the village of Koodankulam. The villagers in Koodankulam are poor fishermen; many of them have either been convinced that they may obtain jobs in the new reactor project, or have been intimidated into silence. However, opposition to the project is now growing. The Indian National Social Action Forum, (INSAF) the National Association of Peoples Movements, (NAPM) and Peace Trust have all sent letters protesting the project and pointing to safety problems with the VVER1000/392 reactor design, to the Prime Minister (whose portfolio includes the Department of Atomic Energy), to the Department of Atomic Energy, and to the Nuclear Power Corporation.

Note: The issue has been painstakingly agreed between Indian activists. It may not be absolutely perfect, but at this stage it isn't possible, in the interests of being fair to everyone, to alter it.

NUCLEAR SAFETY - What ails nuclear safety?

In-depth field studies in nuclear power plants worldwide have shown that they have common features that are essential for reliable operation. DAE's operations do not exhibit these characteristics. Instead, secrecy invoked in the name of national interest is the norm, leading to avoidable risks.

Accident theorists have suggested that the complexity of nuclear power plants makes it difficult to know beforehand everything that might go wrong to cause an accident, and furthermore that these accidents can spread quickly, making the attainment of safety difficult. However, there is a range of operational safety levels and some nuclear plants around the world have operated with relatively high levels of reliability. Organization theorists have studied what such high performing plants have in common, and during in-depth field studies in nuclear power plants they have found common features that they argue are essential for reliable operation.

Characteristics of high reliability operations

What they find is that in nuclear reactors operating at good levels of reliability, political elites and organization leaders place a high priority on safety in design and operations and operators have confidence in this fact. Furthermore, there is an atmosphere of openness and responsibility in which all individuals feel responsible for every detail of operations that they can observe, and feel free to point out their observations without fear. There are reliable backups in technical operations and in management of personnel, and this often prevents failures from escalating. At the same time, there is always a belief that present levels of safety are not enough, so that the guard is never let down. This means that such organizations are always exploring what could go wrong, and learning not only from their mistakes but also from others'.

In India, the Department of Atomic Energy's operations does not satisfy these characteristics. While detailed descriptions of what actually goes on inside India's nuclear facilities are not possible because of lack of access, there is some evidence about DAE's actions leading up to accidents and their response to them.

Lacking a culture of accountability
In 2003, there was an accident in the Kalpakkam Atomic Reprocessing Plant (KARP) that caused extremely high radiation exposures (280-420 mSv) to workers. The cause is said to be a valve failure, due to which highly radioactive waste entered a tank containing waste of lower radioactivity. At the time of the accident, about five years after the plant was commissioned, no monitors had been installed to check for radiation levels in that area. Neither were any mechanisms to detect the valve failure. Therefore workers had no way of knowing that the sample they went in to collect was actually emitting high levels of radiation. The accident was recognized only after a sample collected was taken to a different room and processed. 

Workers do not have control over their immediate environments, and problems cannot be raised openly in DAE\'s facilities.

The response of the management reveals a low priority to worker safety. Workers were also blamed for not wearing their thermo-luminescent badges. This is misdirected: the badges wouldn't have provided advance or immediate warning of radiation levels; rather they are meant to record total exposure over a period of time, to be calculated by another instrument. The absence of the badges reveals instead routine neglect of worker exposures. The management also blamed the workers for entering the room, despite the fact that workers were doing something that wouldn't have attracted comment if the valve hadn't failed. In addition, despite a safety committee's recommendation that the plant be shut down, the upper management of Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC), which oversees KARP, decided to continue operating the plant. Then the employees union wrote a letter to the director setting forth ten safety-related demands, including the appointment of full time safety officer. The letter also recounted two previous incidents where workers were exposed to high levels of radiation in the past two years, and how higher officials had cited emergency as a reason for not following safety procedures. Once again there was no response from the management.

Finally, some months later, when the union resorted to a strike the management transferred some of the key workers involved in the agitation and gave notice to others; this had the desired effect, and two days later all the striking workers joined back. The BARC Director's response was that "If the place was not safe, they would not have joined back".

Organization theorists point out that highly reliable operations are highly demanding and therefore precarious in systems that are structurally prone to accidents, because of the competing priorities and the difficulty of justifying efforts on safety whose direct outcomes are often unclear. But there is little effort on the part of the DAE, and there is low priority given to safety at the highest levels. Workers do not have control over their immediate environments, and problems cannot be raised openly in DAE's facilities. It is also not clear if the important lessons are learnt by the concerned organizations. Even after the leak at KARP was made public, the DAE continued to deny the causes of the problems and instead blamed the workers for a situation over which they had no control. 

The absence of independent regulation

Regardless of the DAE's claims that it operates under strict regulatory supervision, this is not so. The Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) reports to the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), which is headed by the secretary of the DAE. The Chairman of the Nuclear Power Corporation (NPC) is also a member of the AEC. Thus, both the DAE and the NPC exercise considerable administrative powers over the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board. In practice, this means that the AERB sometimes plays down the significance of accidents. For example, in March 1999, there was a leak of heavy water in the second unit of the MAPS reactor near Madras. The AERB dismissed the incident by saying that "the release to the environment is maintained well within the limits specified by the AERB." However, an independent scientist estimated that the radioactivity released to the environment was several times the permitted 300 curies per day per reactor and perhaps even exceeding the discharge limit of 10 times the daily quota, much higher than the AERB claims.

Too much secrecy

The lack of independent regulation is compounded by the difficulty in obtaining information about a program whose details are often shrouded in secrecy. Information about the accident at KARP in 2003 only became public when employee association members leaked information to the media after several unsuccessful attempts to have safety problems addressed by the management. M R Srinivasan, a former head of the DAE, has called upon the organisation to "adopt an enlightened policy of keeping the public informed at all times about safety aspects of its installations". But secrecy persists, and is often justified by the DAE using arguments such as national security. 

 Thus, when the AERB in 1995 submitted a report to the DAE on safety problems in Indian reactors and public-interest organizations filed a petition to obtain access to it, the head of the DAE filed an affidavit arguing that it should be kept under wraps, saying: "I say that the aforesaid document, prepared by the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board in November, 1995 which, among others, is a subject matter of this petition, is a document classified as Secret as it pertains to the nuclear installations in the country which include several sensitive facilities, carrying out activities of a highly classified nature, under the enabling provisions of the Atomic Energy Act, 1962. I respectfully say and submit to this Hon'ble Court that if this document (which was submitted to the Atomic Energy Commission and is classified as SECRET) is required to be published, then it will cause irreparable injury to the interests of the State and will be prejudicial to national security."

Such an argument doesn't stand up to scrutiny. The weapons potential of India's reactors can be inferred from the design details and the operating records submitted to the IAEA, all of which are publicly available. However, making such information public could weaken the DAE's own claims of safe operation and possibly fuel public concern about how its facilities are being operated.

Organization theorists often point to the importance of feedback and learning necessary to maintain high levels of reliability, especially in systems such as nuclear reactors where problems that can occur are not always known in advance. Openness therefore has instrumental benefits for the attainment of safety, and is also required if safe operations are to be demonstrated. On the contrary, the practice of secrecy in India makes it likely that problems are often kept under wraps until a mishap brings them to light. It also violates the right of affected communities to informed participation in the choices that, instead, are made on their behalf.

   

Nuclear Liability Bill: Who bears the brunt?

The nuclear liability bill by capping the liability arising out of a nuclear incident appears to be an effort to protect the nuclear industry at the cost of the fundamental rights of the citizens.

After the Bhopal gas tragedy judgment fiasco, all eyes are on the nuclear liability bill. The civil liability for nuclear damages bill is one the most contentious bills that is listed for consideration and passing in this monsoon session of Parliament. The bill has received a lot of criticism from the opposition parties and civil society on the ground that it has been introduced under US pressure.

Though the bill was approved by the Union Cabinet by November 2009, it could only be introduced at the end of the 2010 budget session. Due to an opposition walkout following its introduction, the bill was referred to the Standing Committee on Science and Technology, Environment and Forests. On June 24, the standing committee invited comments and suggestions on the bill from the public. The government is expecting the committee to come up with its report shortly following which the bill will be tabled in the parliament.

The nuclear liability bill is introduced by the central government with the stated object of fixing nuclear liability arising out of nuclear accident and for joining an appropriate international liability regime. The government (through Science and Technology minister Prithiviraj Chavan) has said that it wants India to enter the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC), 1997, so that supplementary funds are available. The idea to join the CSC itself was originally propounded by a committee set-up by the Vajpayee government.

The bill caps the total liability of any incident at a maximum of 300 million Special Drawing Rights (Rs.2100 crores). Of this amount, the liability of the nuclear operator is fixed at Rs.500 crores while the central government shall be liable for the rest of the amount upto the fixed limit.

Current liability framework

Though nuclear liability is not expressly provided for in any Indian law, right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution, has been interpreted to include within its ambit, the protection and preservation of environment from pollution. The Supreme Court in the Oleum Gas Leak case ruled that an enterprise which is engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous industry with the potential to cause widespread environmental damage, owes an absolute and non-delegable duty to the community to ensure that no harm results to anyone. 

The bill caps the total liability of any incident at a maximum of Rs.2100 crores. Of this amount, the liability of the nuclear operator is fixed at Rs.500 crores while the central government shall be liable for the rest of the amount.  

It held that in case of an accident, irrespective of negligence, the enterprise shall be strictly and absolutely liable to compensate all those who are affected. As nuclear enterprises deal with hazardous material which has the potential to cause widespread environmental damage, under the present legal scenario, it would be strictly liable to compensate all affected by a nuclear accident.

Another important environmental principle which has been recognised both in international law and domestic law is the polluter pays principle. This principle, adopted to further sustainable development, extends the liability of an enterprise not only to compensate the victims of pollution but also the cost of restoring the environmental degradation. In the Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action case, the Supreme Court applied this principle to hold that it is the polluting industry which will be liable for the damage it caused and not the government. Applying the polluter pays principle to nuclear liability, liability should lie exclusively with the nuclear enterprise and not the government.

On the topic of nuclear liability there are four major international conventions - the 1960 Paris Convention, the 1963 Vienna Convention, the 1997 Protocol to Amend Vienna Convention and the 1997 Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC). The CSC, which is still not in force, is only available to members of either the Paris or the Vienna conventions and countries that have enacted a domestic law in compliance with the law annexed to the CSC.

As India is not party to any of these conventions, it has to get a national law which complies with the provisions of the CSC annex for it to be a party to the CSC. The CSC does not require a limit in the liability and provides for supplementary compensation which would be provided through contributions from the different state-parties.

Major issues with the bill

The most contentious feature of the bill is that it caps the total liability of any nuclear incident at a maximum of 300 million Special Drawing Rights (around Rs.2100 crore at current conversion rate). Nuclear accidents are known to cause widespread damage to life and property. If the damage caused by the incident amounts to a larger amount, the compensation cannot be increased.

An absolute cap on liability violates the right to full compensation which, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, is part of the fundamental right to life. Though the claim is that capping liability is essential for entering the nuclear liability regime, the CSC does not have any such limit. In fact, the maximum liability which the bill proposes (300 million SDR) is actually the minimum liability amount prescribed by CSC annex. Also, if the total liability is capped, access to international funds provided by CSC may be blocked.

Out of the maximum amount, the operator of a nuclear plant shall be liable for Rs.500 crores. The central government will be liable for damages in excess of this upto the set limit of Rs.2100 crore rupees (300 million SDR). Fixing the amount of operator liability to Rs.500 crores is much lower than the terms of the CSC annex which states that the liability of the operator may be limited “to not less than” 300 million SDRs, or in cases where the state compensates the remaining loss, not less than 150 million SDRs, which is Rs.1100 crores. 

A less noted and discussed aspect of the bill is that the liability amount for the operator can be further decreased or increased by the central government as long as it does not go below Rs.100 crores. The rock bottom limit of Rs.100 crores has been allowed, following a similar proviso in the CSC's annex to cover post-incident cases where the government has evaluated risk and damages and has then decided to lower the liability cap.

Only 4 countries have ratified the CSC so far, and no country has a cap on the total liability of a nuclear incident. The US, a party to the CSC, has the a domestic liability law (Price-Anderson Act ) which provides for more than $10.5 billion (around 23 times India's limit) in liability from the private nuclear industry and the US Congress can decide to give more compensation if the amount is not sufficient.

By fixing the operator liability at such a low level, India's bill fails to provide sufficient incentive to the operator to prevent nuclear accidents. Moreover, the state’s liability for the balance can be seen as an indirect subsidy towards the nuclear industry and a burden on the taxpayer. By avoiding full compensation and making the government liable for the larger portion of the compensation, the bill violates the polluter pays principle applied by the Supreme Court. More worrying is the fact that the nuclear operator is not liable at all if the accident has occurred due to a grave natural disaster and in cases of terrorism and other armed conflicts. These exceptions violate the absolute liability rule laid down by the Supreme Court.

A crucial concern is that the bill restricts the victim of a nuclear accident from filing cases against the different players in the nuclear industry. The government is also accused of protecting the foreign nuclear suppliers by channeling all the liability to the nuclear operator, which under the present system is a state agency. However the bill gives the nuclear operator a right to sue the nuclear supplier/builder where it is expressly provided in a written contract and the nuclear incident was a result of a willful act or gross negligence of the supplier. 

Another issue is that the bill leaves the determination of the occurrence and gravity of a nuclear accident exclusively to the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) which is already entrusted with the task of regulation of nuclear plants. The worry is that the AERB may not work as a fully independent body as it was created by a government order and is answerable to the Atomic Energy Commission. The bill also ensures that all nuclear damage claims are only dealt by a Nuclear Damage Claims Commissioner or a Nuclear Damage Claims Commission. The bill denies a victim’s right to appeal against the decision of the Commissioner/Commission whose award “shall be final”.

Another problematic aspect of the bill, especially after the experience of the Bhopal gas tragedy, is that it fixes a limitation period of 10 years for filing cases. Damage from radioactive release, as the environment ministry pointed out, involves changes in DNA and hence takes a long time to manifest. By putting a short limitation period, people who acquire diseases long after the incident will not be allowed to sue.

Summing up

The nuclear liability bill presents a clear departure from the existing legal principles on liability applied by the Supreme Court. The rationale behind such an exception for the inherently hazardous nuclear industry is not clear. The premise that limiting liability is essential for joining an international convention like CSC does not have any merit as the convention does not require the state to limit the liability.

The rationale behind fixing the liability of the operators at a very low amount seems to be for allowing the nuclear operators to easily acquire the mandatory insurance cover required by the bill. With the passing of the Indo-US Nuclear Deal, private companies are expected to start its operations in India. The bill seems to be an effort to lure foreign enterprises to enter the nuclear industry to meet India’s enormous energy requirements. However, to achieve this, the bill has burdened the taxpayer and has restricted the right of victims protected by the Constitution.

As noted earlier, the Supreme Court has followed the polluter pays principle. Moreso, because the bill denies the right to full compensation which is a part of the fundamental right to life (Article 21), the bill in its current form, if passed, is likely to be struck down by the court if someone challenges it.

'We don't sell our mother'

MAHARASHTRA-KONKAN NUCLEAR POWER PROJECT

There has been substantial resistance to the Jaitapur Nuclear Power Park being set up in the Konkan region of Maharashtra, in Ratnagiri district. The political consensus for nuclear power has once against brushed aside legitimate local concerns.

As expected, French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s India visit early December 2010 has materialized in signing of General Framework Agreement for building the European Pressure Reactors (EPRs) for Jaitapur Nuclear Power Park (JNPP). However, many issues remain unresolved as admitted by India’s Prime Minister Manmohan Singh who reportedly said “there are issues of pricing ..these are matters of negotiations” which is linked to insurance cost and which, in turn, is linked with nuclear liability concerns.

But there are many other issues which the officials don’t seem to be much concerned about. There are environmental concerns and safety risks besides displacing people and ruining their livelihood, says Dr Sulabha Brahme, renowned economist and environmentalist from Pune. As build-up to Sarkozy’s visit, the protests against JNPP had intensified last few months. On the eve of French President’s visit to India, project affected people led a ‘Court Arrest’ procession to JNPP site in Madban to express strong opposition to this nuclear project. 

                                                   The Madban plateau is a complete ecosystem.

However, the peaceful march turned violent when the Police tried to stop the procession since protestors defied Section 144 of IPC. Some 3000 protestors including well-known people like former High Court Judge B G Kolse-Patil, Pravin Gavankar of Madban’s Janhit Sewa Samiti, Dr Vivek Bhide of Konkan Bachav Samiti, fisherfolk leader Amjad Borkar, Vaishali Patil of Konkan Bachav Samiti, and others were arrested by the Police. The Shiv Sena also jumped the bandwagon protesting “you can’t build a project breaking heads of the natives..”

To pave the way for agreement on JNPP during French President’s visit, Union environment minister Jairam Ramesh, who had earlier accepted the environmental concerns about JNPP, was sort of forced to give environment clearance with 35 conditions. Even now Ramesh reportedly admits, “It was not an easy task... It is a balancing act. I do not expect all environmentalists to be happy with this decision. I am prepared for quite a few brickbats.” Also he himself pointed out that his ministry has no jurisdiction over radiology emission — a major concern among locals and environmentalists. The Indian Express reported this on 29th November, 2010.

Ramesh voices the same concerns as environmentalists and reportedly said while announcing the clearance in Mumbai on November 29, 2010, “I am aware that the Jaitapur power project is coming up in an eco-sensitive area. There are other power projects coming up on a thin strip of coast of Raigad, Ratnagiri and Sindhudurg with power generation adding up to 33,000 MW. There are port and mining projects also lined up in this area. It is absolutely essential to get an assurance from the Maharashtra government to study the cumulative carrying capacity of the region and prepare a report.”

And yet Narayan Rane, the then revenue minister of Maharashtra state had reportedly said, “Some outsiders who can’t tolerate progress are opposing the project, not local farmers”. In fact, it is these very farmers who, under the leadership of a Madban resident Pravin Gavankar formed Janhit Sewa Samiti in 2006 when they received notices of land acquisition from the government.

Stiff opposition 

On January 22, 2010, 2335 farmers from four villages - Madban, Karel, Niveli and Mithgavane from Ratnagiri district of Konkan region of Maharashtra, refused to accept cheques of compensation for their 938 hectares of land forcibly acquired by the government through the Nuclear Power Corporation of India. This was for the Jaitapur Nuclear Power Park (JNPP). Only 56 landowners, most of who are settled in Mumbai-Pune for decades, accepted this compensation and got rid of their land.

Last October, the state government established a committee to revise the compensation and announced a rehabilitation package that includes Rs 2 crore with a recurring amount of Rs 25 lakh for each of the four villages; permanent job for farmer’s kin or Rs 5 lakh; and an amount equivalent to 375 to 750 days of agricultural wages for lifetime to compensate for the loss of livelihood.

The villagers burnt the copies of this package shouting slogans ‘we don’t sell our mother’ and ‘beggars accept money (for their motherland)’. On October 29, 2010 more than 2000 farmers and fisher folk assembled despite prohibitory orders, to court arrest to protest against the proposed nuclear power project on their fertile land.

The Enron fiasco of 1990's has had its impact on stirring opinion against ecologically disastrous power, mining and other polluting industrial projects that are being thrust on the narrow coastal strip of Konkan. The Janhit Sewa Samiti got in touch with the Enron protesters of Dabhol to learn from their experience as they had undergone the same fate in early 90's. 

Almost as if it were to pave the way for an agreement during the French President’s visit, environment minister Jairam Ramesh, who had earlier accepted the environmental concerns about JNPP, cleared the project with 35 conditions.  

Through them, the Samiti came to know about many experts and environmentalists like nuclear physicist Surendra Gadekar who informed them about possible threats of atomic energy and eminent economist Dr Sulabha Brahme who wrote scientifically well researched booklets to inform people and ran advocacy campaigns. Some activists are involved in awareness campaigns through street plays etc. “The role of so called outsiders is limited to these supportive activities. It is basically local people who are opposing the JNPP tooth and nail from day 1 since they know for sure that this project means end to their livelihood besides destruction of bountiful nature”, says Dr Sulabha Brahme.

Environmental impact assessment glosses over reality

Of the six nuclear reactors of 1650 MW each, two are proposed to be set up in the first phase at a cost of Rs 60000 crore. For environment clearance, National Environmental Engineering Research Institute (NEERI) was asked to prepare EIA. NEERI is a constituent of Council of Scientific & Industrial Research (CSIR), New Delhi which conducts research and developmental studies in environmental science and engineering. For one of the impacts i.e. risk of ecological damage, NEERI asked College of Forestry, Konkan Krishi Vidyapith (KKV) to prepare a report. 

 Sulabha Brahme, noted economist and writer-activist has thrown her lot with the resistance movement.

Says Brahme, “After careful study of KKV report, we found that it was lacking in appropriate study design and careful scientific approach. For example, the floristic study was carried out without frequent field visits in all seasons to collect plant material samples.” Says Premanand Turalkar from Madban, “I recorded my objection on how KKV was entrusted a job for which they have never undertaken a survey of the region to be studied. Its report shows that there is not a single well in Madban village. Then what water we villagers drink, seawater?”

And then in the absence of methodologically sound survey and scientific data analysis, KVV, NEERI and hence NPCIL came to the conclusion that ‘Madban plateau is a barren wasteland with no ecological value’. “Look at the collage of these photos of Madban and do you call this wasteland with no ecological value?” quips Dr Brahme.

“In fact, the NEERI-KVV team has not realized that the Madban plateau, green forests along the hill slopes, wetland habitat and thick mangroves along the creek, the Arjuna river and the creek waters rich in marine life together form an integrated and unique ecosystem supporting wide variety of flora and fauna. The NEERI-KVV study has not considered the essential part i.e. the plant animal interactions, ethnobotanical and anthropological studies” highlights an appeal for signature campaign by the Janhit Sewa Samiti. Parallel studies by the Bombay Natural History Society have shown that the project will cause substantial environmental damage. According to National Oceanography Goa, Jaitapur comes under earthquake-prone zone and hence a nuclear power plant is not advisable.

Environment minister Jairam Ramesh admitted to the deficiencies in this NEERI’s EIA, when a delegation met him in May 2010 to bring to his notice the facts about Madban and ecological disastrous impact of a nuclear power plant there.

But political compulsions seemed to had driven Ramesh to give green signal to the project just before Sarkozy’s India visit.

Policy drive to boost nuclear-based generation

Notwithstanding all this and people's stiff opposition, the central government went ahead with an agreement for nuclear reactors from the French company Areva during the French President Sarkozy’s visit to India, even when the design of the plant is not yet ready. Doubts are also being raised about its techno-economic viability and the former chairperson of the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, A Gopalakrishnan, questions the wisdom of India entering into a contract with Areva “for the EPR which is unproved and is plagued by delays and cost overruns."

After 1978, no new Nuclear Power plant has come up in the USA. The 1986 Chernobyl accident almost put a stop to atomic energy projects in western countries (except France & Finland) especially in the face of stiff protests by their citizens on the issues of radiation. Thus American and Western companies turned towards Asian countries to palm off their technology and many nuclear power plants came up in China, Japan, South Korea and India. 

                                                  Madban's Rich Mangroves.

Since India is not ready to sign the NPT, USA found it difficult to transfer nuclear technology and hence brought in a special ‘Hyde Act’ to pave a way into Indian nuclear energy market. Under the garb of augmenting energy availability, the Indian Government decided to expand nuclear power generation in the country from 4120 MW to 63000 MW by 2032.”Coastal regions are the natural choice for nuclear power plants since they require huge amount of water for cooling activities besides using sea route for imported machinery, fuel and other supplies” says Brahme. Accordingly, most of 31 new nuclear power plants have been approved along both the east and the west coastal belt in India.

This is how the largest ever nuclear power project in Asia of 9900 MW capacity was approved at Madban.

Public hearing turns farce

With such concocted EIA to suit the decision makers, the NPCIL went ahead to acquire the land during October 9-December 1, 2009 and started soil testing activities. Besides, land will be acquired for laying transmission lines which means yet another body blow to other villages along the transmission route, says Pravin Gavankar.

A public hearing on proposed project by the NPCIL on May 16, 2010 at Madban was a mere farce. Around 1000 people attended. The mandatory requirement of providing EIA report in local language to affected villagers a month in advance was not met. Only Madban Gram Panchayat received a copy a month ago in English and just four days before the public hearing in Marathi, thus violating the Environment Protection Act 1986 and Environment Protection Rules 2006 & 2009.

The officials present at this public hearing, Madhukar Gaikwad, the collector MPCB, Ratnagiri, project official Shashikant Dharane and project advisor Umesh Kilkarni were at loss when specific queries were made by the people. Dr Vivek Montero of Indian School of Social Sciences took on these officials saying, “You do not know cost of nuclear energy per megawatt of these reactors; you do not know cost of uranium, you do not know cost of storage facility. Then on what basis, you claim that the electricity will be provided at competitive rates? We have given you detailed calculation (which NPCIL officials agreed to) based on capital power cost of Rs 18 crore per MW i.e. Rs 9 per unit as against NPCIL’s current Rs 2.24 per unit! So NPCIL should do its homework first before taking any kind of hurried decisions.” 

On question of nuclear waste, Dharane said that it will be encapsulated under the concrete cover for 100 years and the government is searching for such a site. Dr Monteiro noted that radioactive waste is highly dangerous for 10000 years. And America, France, Finland and other countries do not have such depositories now. Without these depositories, the Indian Government is putting future generation of the whole country to expose from nuclear radiations for thousands of years! He added that these plants are not designed for protection against terrorism.

Commenting on the environmental study at the hearing, Amjad Borkar of Fishermen’s Society said, “NEERI appears weak in study of fisheries. Sea water will be drawn in these six nuclear reactors and the same at higher temperature will be released in to the sea at 1.5-2.5 km distance which will cause sea water temperature to rise up to 5 degree Celsius. This will completely destroy fisheries. NEERI which wrote reports sitting on the table is completely oblivious of sea level and depth. The sea gets deeper as you move southward from Mumbai. The Maharashtra government has restricted fishing activities up to 10 fathoms which is within 2 km where the hot sea water from reactors will be released. So NEERI has not thought of fisher folk.”