NUCLEAR SAFETY - What ails nuclear safety?

In-depth field studies in nuclear power plants worldwide have shown that they have common features that are essential for reliable operation. DAE's operations do not exhibit these characteristics. Instead, secrecy invoked in the name of national interest is the norm, leading to avoidable risks.

Accident theorists have suggested that the complexity of nuclear power plants makes it difficult to know beforehand everything that might go wrong to cause an accident, and furthermore that these accidents can spread quickly, making the attainment of safety difficult. However, there is a range of operational safety levels and some nuclear plants around the world have operated with relatively high levels of reliability. Organization theorists have studied what such high performing plants have in common, and during in-depth field studies in nuclear power plants they have found common features that they argue are essential for reliable operation.

Characteristics of high reliability operations

What they find is that in nuclear reactors operating at good levels of reliability, political elites and organization leaders place a high priority on safety in design and operations and operators have confidence in this fact. Furthermore, there is an atmosphere of openness and responsibility in which all individuals feel responsible for every detail of operations that they can observe, and feel free to point out their observations without fear. There are reliable backups in technical operations and in management of personnel, and this often prevents failures from escalating. At the same time, there is always a belief that present levels of safety are not enough, so that the guard is never let down. This means that such organizations are always exploring what could go wrong, and learning not only from their mistakes but also from others'.

In India, the Department of Atomic Energy's operations does not satisfy these characteristics. While detailed descriptions of what actually goes on inside India's nuclear facilities are not possible because of lack of access, there is some evidence about DAE's actions leading up to accidents and their response to them.

Lacking a culture of accountability
In 2003, there was an accident in the Kalpakkam Atomic Reprocessing Plant (KARP) that caused extremely high radiation exposures (280-420 mSv) to workers. The cause is said to be a valve failure, due to which highly radioactive waste entered a tank containing waste of lower radioactivity. At the time of the accident, about five years after the plant was commissioned, no monitors had been installed to check for radiation levels in that area. Neither were any mechanisms to detect the valve failure. Therefore workers had no way of knowing that the sample they went in to collect was actually emitting high levels of radiation. The accident was recognized only after a sample collected was taken to a different room and processed. 

Workers do not have control over their immediate environments, and problems cannot be raised openly in DAE\'s facilities.

The response of the management reveals a low priority to worker safety. Workers were also blamed for not wearing their thermo-luminescent badges. This is misdirected: the badges wouldn't have provided advance or immediate warning of radiation levels; rather they are meant to record total exposure over a period of time, to be calculated by another instrument. The absence of the badges reveals instead routine neglect of worker exposures. The management also blamed the workers for entering the room, despite the fact that workers were doing something that wouldn't have attracted comment if the valve hadn't failed. In addition, despite a safety committee's recommendation that the plant be shut down, the upper management of Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC), which oversees KARP, decided to continue operating the plant. Then the employees union wrote a letter to the director setting forth ten safety-related demands, including the appointment of full time safety officer. The letter also recounted two previous incidents where workers were exposed to high levels of radiation in the past two years, and how higher officials had cited emergency as a reason for not following safety procedures. Once again there was no response from the management.

Finally, some months later, when the union resorted to a strike the management transferred some of the key workers involved in the agitation and gave notice to others; this had the desired effect, and two days later all the striking workers joined back. The BARC Director's response was that "If the place was not safe, they would not have joined back".

Organization theorists point out that highly reliable operations are highly demanding and therefore precarious in systems that are structurally prone to accidents, because of the competing priorities and the difficulty of justifying efforts on safety whose direct outcomes are often unclear. But there is little effort on the part of the DAE, and there is low priority given to safety at the highest levels. Workers do not have control over their immediate environments, and problems cannot be raised openly in DAE's facilities. It is also not clear if the important lessons are learnt by the concerned organizations. Even after the leak at KARP was made public, the DAE continued to deny the causes of the problems and instead blamed the workers for a situation over which they had no control. 

The absence of independent regulation

Regardless of the DAE's claims that it operates under strict regulatory supervision, this is not so. The Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) reports to the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), which is headed by the secretary of the DAE. The Chairman of the Nuclear Power Corporation (NPC) is also a member of the AEC. Thus, both the DAE and the NPC exercise considerable administrative powers over the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board. In practice, this means that the AERB sometimes plays down the significance of accidents. For example, in March 1999, there was a leak of heavy water in the second unit of the MAPS reactor near Madras. The AERB dismissed the incident by saying that "the release to the environment is maintained well within the limits specified by the AERB." However, an independent scientist estimated that the radioactivity released to the environment was several times the permitted 300 curies per day per reactor and perhaps even exceeding the discharge limit of 10 times the daily quota, much higher than the AERB claims.

Too much secrecy

The lack of independent regulation is compounded by the difficulty in obtaining information about a program whose details are often shrouded in secrecy. Information about the accident at KARP in 2003 only became public when employee association members leaked information to the media after several unsuccessful attempts to have safety problems addressed by the management. M R Srinivasan, a former head of the DAE, has called upon the organisation to "adopt an enlightened policy of keeping the public informed at all times about safety aspects of its installations". But secrecy persists, and is often justified by the DAE using arguments such as national security. 

 Thus, when the AERB in 1995 submitted a report to the DAE on safety problems in Indian reactors and public-interest organizations filed a petition to obtain access to it, the head of the DAE filed an affidavit arguing that it should be kept under wraps, saying: "I say that the aforesaid document, prepared by the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board in November, 1995 which, among others, is a subject matter of this petition, is a document classified as Secret as it pertains to the nuclear installations in the country which include several sensitive facilities, carrying out activities of a highly classified nature, under the enabling provisions of the Atomic Energy Act, 1962. I respectfully say and submit to this Hon'ble Court that if this document (which was submitted to the Atomic Energy Commission and is classified as SECRET) is required to be published, then it will cause irreparable injury to the interests of the State and will be prejudicial to national security."

Such an argument doesn't stand up to scrutiny. The weapons potential of India's reactors can be inferred from the design details and the operating records submitted to the IAEA, all of which are publicly available. However, making such information public could weaken the DAE's own claims of safe operation and possibly fuel public concern about how its facilities are being operated.

Organization theorists often point to the importance of feedback and learning necessary to maintain high levels of reliability, especially in systems such as nuclear reactors where problems that can occur are not always known in advance. Openness therefore has instrumental benefits for the attainment of safety, and is also required if safe operations are to be demonstrated. On the contrary, the practice of secrecy in India makes it likely that problems are often kept under wraps until a mishap brings them to light. It also violates the right of affected communities to informed participation in the choices that, instead, are made on their behalf.

   

Nuclear Liability Bill: Who bears the brunt?

The nuclear liability bill by capping the liability arising out of a nuclear incident appears to be an effort to protect the nuclear industry at the cost of the fundamental rights of the citizens.

After the Bhopal gas tragedy judgment fiasco, all eyes are on the nuclear liability bill. The civil liability for nuclear damages bill is one the most contentious bills that is listed for consideration and passing in this monsoon session of Parliament. The bill has received a lot of criticism from the opposition parties and civil society on the ground that it has been introduced under US pressure.

Though the bill was approved by the Union Cabinet by November 2009, it could only be introduced at the end of the 2010 budget session. Due to an opposition walkout following its introduction, the bill was referred to the Standing Committee on Science and Technology, Environment and Forests. On June 24, the standing committee invited comments and suggestions on the bill from the public. The government is expecting the committee to come up with its report shortly following which the bill will be tabled in the parliament.

The nuclear liability bill is introduced by the central government with the stated object of fixing nuclear liability arising out of nuclear accident and for joining an appropriate international liability regime. The government (through Science and Technology minister Prithiviraj Chavan) has said that it wants India to enter the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC), 1997, so that supplementary funds are available. The idea to join the CSC itself was originally propounded by a committee set-up by the Vajpayee government.

The bill caps the total liability of any incident at a maximum of 300 million Special Drawing Rights (Rs.2100 crores). Of this amount, the liability of the nuclear operator is fixed at Rs.500 crores while the central government shall be liable for the rest of the amount upto the fixed limit.

Current liability framework

Though nuclear liability is not expressly provided for in any Indian law, right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution, has been interpreted to include within its ambit, the protection and preservation of environment from pollution. The Supreme Court in the Oleum Gas Leak case ruled that an enterprise which is engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous industry with the potential to cause widespread environmental damage, owes an absolute and non-delegable duty to the community to ensure that no harm results to anyone. 

The bill caps the total liability of any incident at a maximum of Rs.2100 crores. Of this amount, the liability of the nuclear operator is fixed at Rs.500 crores while the central government shall be liable for the rest of the amount.  

It held that in case of an accident, irrespective of negligence, the enterprise shall be strictly and absolutely liable to compensate all those who are affected. As nuclear enterprises deal with hazardous material which has the potential to cause widespread environmental damage, under the present legal scenario, it would be strictly liable to compensate all affected by a nuclear accident.

Another important environmental principle which has been recognised both in international law and domestic law is the polluter pays principle. This principle, adopted to further sustainable development, extends the liability of an enterprise not only to compensate the victims of pollution but also the cost of restoring the environmental degradation. In the Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action case, the Supreme Court applied this principle to hold that it is the polluting industry which will be liable for the damage it caused and not the government. Applying the polluter pays principle to nuclear liability, liability should lie exclusively with the nuclear enterprise and not the government.

On the topic of nuclear liability there are four major international conventions - the 1960 Paris Convention, the 1963 Vienna Convention, the 1997 Protocol to Amend Vienna Convention and the 1997 Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC). The CSC, which is still not in force, is only available to members of either the Paris or the Vienna conventions and countries that have enacted a domestic law in compliance with the law annexed to the CSC.

As India is not party to any of these conventions, it has to get a national law which complies with the provisions of the CSC annex for it to be a party to the CSC. The CSC does not require a limit in the liability and provides for supplementary compensation which would be provided through contributions from the different state-parties.

Major issues with the bill

The most contentious feature of the bill is that it caps the total liability of any nuclear incident at a maximum of 300 million Special Drawing Rights (around Rs.2100 crore at current conversion rate). Nuclear accidents are known to cause widespread damage to life and property. If the damage caused by the incident amounts to a larger amount, the compensation cannot be increased.

An absolute cap on liability violates the right to full compensation which, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, is part of the fundamental right to life. Though the claim is that capping liability is essential for entering the nuclear liability regime, the CSC does not have any such limit. In fact, the maximum liability which the bill proposes (300 million SDR) is actually the minimum liability amount prescribed by CSC annex. Also, if the total liability is capped, access to international funds provided by CSC may be blocked.

Out of the maximum amount, the operator of a nuclear plant shall be liable for Rs.500 crores. The central government will be liable for damages in excess of this upto the set limit of Rs.2100 crore rupees (300 million SDR). Fixing the amount of operator liability to Rs.500 crores is much lower than the terms of the CSC annex which states that the liability of the operator may be limited “to not less than” 300 million SDRs, or in cases where the state compensates the remaining loss, not less than 150 million SDRs, which is Rs.1100 crores. 

A less noted and discussed aspect of the bill is that the liability amount for the operator can be further decreased or increased by the central government as long as it does not go below Rs.100 crores. The rock bottom limit of Rs.100 crores has been allowed, following a similar proviso in the CSC's annex to cover post-incident cases where the government has evaluated risk and damages and has then decided to lower the liability cap.

Only 4 countries have ratified the CSC so far, and no country has a cap on the total liability of a nuclear incident. The US, a party to the CSC, has the a domestic liability law (Price-Anderson Act ) which provides for more than $10.5 billion (around 23 times India's limit) in liability from the private nuclear industry and the US Congress can decide to give more compensation if the amount is not sufficient.

By fixing the operator liability at such a low level, India's bill fails to provide sufficient incentive to the operator to prevent nuclear accidents. Moreover, the state’s liability for the balance can be seen as an indirect subsidy towards the nuclear industry and a burden on the taxpayer. By avoiding full compensation and making the government liable for the larger portion of the compensation, the bill violates the polluter pays principle applied by the Supreme Court. More worrying is the fact that the nuclear operator is not liable at all if the accident has occurred due to a grave natural disaster and in cases of terrorism and other armed conflicts. These exceptions violate the absolute liability rule laid down by the Supreme Court.

A crucial concern is that the bill restricts the victim of a nuclear accident from filing cases against the different players in the nuclear industry. The government is also accused of protecting the foreign nuclear suppliers by channeling all the liability to the nuclear operator, which under the present system is a state agency. However the bill gives the nuclear operator a right to sue the nuclear supplier/builder where it is expressly provided in a written contract and the nuclear incident was a result of a willful act or gross negligence of the supplier. 

Another issue is that the bill leaves the determination of the occurrence and gravity of a nuclear accident exclusively to the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) which is already entrusted with the task of regulation of nuclear plants. The worry is that the AERB may not work as a fully independent body as it was created by a government order and is answerable to the Atomic Energy Commission. The bill also ensures that all nuclear damage claims are only dealt by a Nuclear Damage Claims Commissioner or a Nuclear Damage Claims Commission. The bill denies a victim’s right to appeal against the decision of the Commissioner/Commission whose award “shall be final”.

Another problematic aspect of the bill, especially after the experience of the Bhopal gas tragedy, is that it fixes a limitation period of 10 years for filing cases. Damage from radioactive release, as the environment ministry pointed out, involves changes in DNA and hence takes a long time to manifest. By putting a short limitation period, people who acquire diseases long after the incident will not be allowed to sue.

Summing up

The nuclear liability bill presents a clear departure from the existing legal principles on liability applied by the Supreme Court. The rationale behind such an exception for the inherently hazardous nuclear industry is not clear. The premise that limiting liability is essential for joining an international convention like CSC does not have any merit as the convention does not require the state to limit the liability.

The rationale behind fixing the liability of the operators at a very low amount seems to be for allowing the nuclear operators to easily acquire the mandatory insurance cover required by the bill. With the passing of the Indo-US Nuclear Deal, private companies are expected to start its operations in India. The bill seems to be an effort to lure foreign enterprises to enter the nuclear industry to meet India’s enormous energy requirements. However, to achieve this, the bill has burdened the taxpayer and has restricted the right of victims protected by the Constitution.

As noted earlier, the Supreme Court has followed the polluter pays principle. Moreso, because the bill denies the right to full compensation which is a part of the fundamental right to life (Article 21), the bill in its current form, if passed, is likely to be struck down by the court if someone challenges it.

'We don't sell our mother'

MAHARASHTRA-KONKAN NUCLEAR POWER PROJECT

There has been substantial resistance to the Jaitapur Nuclear Power Park being set up in the Konkan region of Maharashtra, in Ratnagiri district. The political consensus for nuclear power has once against brushed aside legitimate local concerns.

As expected, French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s India visit early December 2010 has materialized in signing of General Framework Agreement for building the European Pressure Reactors (EPRs) for Jaitapur Nuclear Power Park (JNPP). However, many issues remain unresolved as admitted by India’s Prime Minister Manmohan Singh who reportedly said “there are issues of pricing ..these are matters of negotiations” which is linked to insurance cost and which, in turn, is linked with nuclear liability concerns.

But there are many other issues which the officials don’t seem to be much concerned about. There are environmental concerns and safety risks besides displacing people and ruining their livelihood, says Dr Sulabha Brahme, renowned economist and environmentalist from Pune. As build-up to Sarkozy’s visit, the protests against JNPP had intensified last few months. On the eve of French President’s visit to India, project affected people led a ‘Court Arrest’ procession to JNPP site in Madban to express strong opposition to this nuclear project. 

                                                   The Madban plateau is a complete ecosystem.

However, the peaceful march turned violent when the Police tried to stop the procession since protestors defied Section 144 of IPC. Some 3000 protestors including well-known people like former High Court Judge B G Kolse-Patil, Pravin Gavankar of Madban’s Janhit Sewa Samiti, Dr Vivek Bhide of Konkan Bachav Samiti, fisherfolk leader Amjad Borkar, Vaishali Patil of Konkan Bachav Samiti, and others were arrested by the Police. The Shiv Sena also jumped the bandwagon protesting “you can’t build a project breaking heads of the natives..”

To pave the way for agreement on JNPP during French President’s visit, Union environment minister Jairam Ramesh, who had earlier accepted the environmental concerns about JNPP, was sort of forced to give environment clearance with 35 conditions. Even now Ramesh reportedly admits, “It was not an easy task... It is a balancing act. I do not expect all environmentalists to be happy with this decision. I am prepared for quite a few brickbats.” Also he himself pointed out that his ministry has no jurisdiction over radiology emission — a major concern among locals and environmentalists. The Indian Express reported this on 29th November, 2010.

Ramesh voices the same concerns as environmentalists and reportedly said while announcing the clearance in Mumbai on November 29, 2010, “I am aware that the Jaitapur power project is coming up in an eco-sensitive area. There are other power projects coming up on a thin strip of coast of Raigad, Ratnagiri and Sindhudurg with power generation adding up to 33,000 MW. There are port and mining projects also lined up in this area. It is absolutely essential to get an assurance from the Maharashtra government to study the cumulative carrying capacity of the region and prepare a report.”

And yet Narayan Rane, the then revenue minister of Maharashtra state had reportedly said, “Some outsiders who can’t tolerate progress are opposing the project, not local farmers”. In fact, it is these very farmers who, under the leadership of a Madban resident Pravin Gavankar formed Janhit Sewa Samiti in 2006 when they received notices of land acquisition from the government.

Stiff opposition 

On January 22, 2010, 2335 farmers from four villages - Madban, Karel, Niveli and Mithgavane from Ratnagiri district of Konkan region of Maharashtra, refused to accept cheques of compensation for their 938 hectares of land forcibly acquired by the government through the Nuclear Power Corporation of India. This was for the Jaitapur Nuclear Power Park (JNPP). Only 56 landowners, most of who are settled in Mumbai-Pune for decades, accepted this compensation and got rid of their land.

Last October, the state government established a committee to revise the compensation and announced a rehabilitation package that includes Rs 2 crore with a recurring amount of Rs 25 lakh for each of the four villages; permanent job for farmer’s kin or Rs 5 lakh; and an amount equivalent to 375 to 750 days of agricultural wages for lifetime to compensate for the loss of livelihood.

The villagers burnt the copies of this package shouting slogans ‘we don’t sell our mother’ and ‘beggars accept money (for their motherland)’. On October 29, 2010 more than 2000 farmers and fisher folk assembled despite prohibitory orders, to court arrest to protest against the proposed nuclear power project on their fertile land.

The Enron fiasco of 1990's has had its impact on stirring opinion against ecologically disastrous power, mining and other polluting industrial projects that are being thrust on the narrow coastal strip of Konkan. The Janhit Sewa Samiti got in touch with the Enron protesters of Dabhol to learn from their experience as they had undergone the same fate in early 90's. 

Almost as if it were to pave the way for an agreement during the French President’s visit, environment minister Jairam Ramesh, who had earlier accepted the environmental concerns about JNPP, cleared the project with 35 conditions.  

Through them, the Samiti came to know about many experts and environmentalists like nuclear physicist Surendra Gadekar who informed them about possible threats of atomic energy and eminent economist Dr Sulabha Brahme who wrote scientifically well researched booklets to inform people and ran advocacy campaigns. Some activists are involved in awareness campaigns through street plays etc. “The role of so called outsiders is limited to these supportive activities. It is basically local people who are opposing the JNPP tooth and nail from day 1 since they know for sure that this project means end to their livelihood besides destruction of bountiful nature”, says Dr Sulabha Brahme.

Environmental impact assessment glosses over reality

Of the six nuclear reactors of 1650 MW each, two are proposed to be set up in the first phase at a cost of Rs 60000 crore. For environment clearance, National Environmental Engineering Research Institute (NEERI) was asked to prepare EIA. NEERI is a constituent of Council of Scientific & Industrial Research (CSIR), New Delhi which conducts research and developmental studies in environmental science and engineering. For one of the impacts i.e. risk of ecological damage, NEERI asked College of Forestry, Konkan Krishi Vidyapith (KKV) to prepare a report. 

 Sulabha Brahme, noted economist and writer-activist has thrown her lot with the resistance movement.

Says Brahme, “After careful study of KKV report, we found that it was lacking in appropriate study design and careful scientific approach. For example, the floristic study was carried out without frequent field visits in all seasons to collect plant material samples.” Says Premanand Turalkar from Madban, “I recorded my objection on how KKV was entrusted a job for which they have never undertaken a survey of the region to be studied. Its report shows that there is not a single well in Madban village. Then what water we villagers drink, seawater?”

And then in the absence of methodologically sound survey and scientific data analysis, KVV, NEERI and hence NPCIL came to the conclusion that ‘Madban plateau is a barren wasteland with no ecological value’. “Look at the collage of these photos of Madban and do you call this wasteland with no ecological value?” quips Dr Brahme.

“In fact, the NEERI-KVV team has not realized that the Madban plateau, green forests along the hill slopes, wetland habitat and thick mangroves along the creek, the Arjuna river and the creek waters rich in marine life together form an integrated and unique ecosystem supporting wide variety of flora and fauna. The NEERI-KVV study has not considered the essential part i.e. the plant animal interactions, ethnobotanical and anthropological studies” highlights an appeal for signature campaign by the Janhit Sewa Samiti. Parallel studies by the Bombay Natural History Society have shown that the project will cause substantial environmental damage. According to National Oceanography Goa, Jaitapur comes under earthquake-prone zone and hence a nuclear power plant is not advisable.

Environment minister Jairam Ramesh admitted to the deficiencies in this NEERI’s EIA, when a delegation met him in May 2010 to bring to his notice the facts about Madban and ecological disastrous impact of a nuclear power plant there.

But political compulsions seemed to had driven Ramesh to give green signal to the project just before Sarkozy’s India visit.

Policy drive to boost nuclear-based generation

Notwithstanding all this and people's stiff opposition, the central government went ahead with an agreement for nuclear reactors from the French company Areva during the French President Sarkozy’s visit to India, even when the design of the plant is not yet ready. Doubts are also being raised about its techno-economic viability and the former chairperson of the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, A Gopalakrishnan, questions the wisdom of India entering into a contract with Areva “for the EPR which is unproved and is plagued by delays and cost overruns."

After 1978, no new Nuclear Power plant has come up in the USA. The 1986 Chernobyl accident almost put a stop to atomic energy projects in western countries (except France & Finland) especially in the face of stiff protests by their citizens on the issues of radiation. Thus American and Western companies turned towards Asian countries to palm off their technology and many nuclear power plants came up in China, Japan, South Korea and India. 

                                                  Madban's Rich Mangroves.

Since India is not ready to sign the NPT, USA found it difficult to transfer nuclear technology and hence brought in a special ‘Hyde Act’ to pave a way into Indian nuclear energy market. Under the garb of augmenting energy availability, the Indian Government decided to expand nuclear power generation in the country from 4120 MW to 63000 MW by 2032.”Coastal regions are the natural choice for nuclear power plants since they require huge amount of water for cooling activities besides using sea route for imported machinery, fuel and other supplies” says Brahme. Accordingly, most of 31 new nuclear power plants have been approved along both the east and the west coastal belt in India.

This is how the largest ever nuclear power project in Asia of 9900 MW capacity was approved at Madban.

Public hearing turns farce

With such concocted EIA to suit the decision makers, the NPCIL went ahead to acquire the land during October 9-December 1, 2009 and started soil testing activities. Besides, land will be acquired for laying transmission lines which means yet another body blow to other villages along the transmission route, says Pravin Gavankar.

A public hearing on proposed project by the NPCIL on May 16, 2010 at Madban was a mere farce. Around 1000 people attended. The mandatory requirement of providing EIA report in local language to affected villagers a month in advance was not met. Only Madban Gram Panchayat received a copy a month ago in English and just four days before the public hearing in Marathi, thus violating the Environment Protection Act 1986 and Environment Protection Rules 2006 & 2009.

The officials present at this public hearing, Madhukar Gaikwad, the collector MPCB, Ratnagiri, project official Shashikant Dharane and project advisor Umesh Kilkarni were at loss when specific queries were made by the people. Dr Vivek Montero of Indian School of Social Sciences took on these officials saying, “You do not know cost of nuclear energy per megawatt of these reactors; you do not know cost of uranium, you do not know cost of storage facility. Then on what basis, you claim that the electricity will be provided at competitive rates? We have given you detailed calculation (which NPCIL officials agreed to) based on capital power cost of Rs 18 crore per MW i.e. Rs 9 per unit as against NPCIL’s current Rs 2.24 per unit! So NPCIL should do its homework first before taking any kind of hurried decisions.” 

On question of nuclear waste, Dharane said that it will be encapsulated under the concrete cover for 100 years and the government is searching for such a site. Dr Monteiro noted that radioactive waste is highly dangerous for 10000 years. And America, France, Finland and other countries do not have such depositories now. Without these depositories, the Indian Government is putting future generation of the whole country to expose from nuclear radiations for thousands of years! He added that these plants are not designed for protection against terrorism.

Commenting on the environmental study at the hearing, Amjad Borkar of Fishermen’s Society said, “NEERI appears weak in study of fisheries. Sea water will be drawn in these six nuclear reactors and the same at higher temperature will be released in to the sea at 1.5-2.5 km distance which will cause sea water temperature to rise up to 5 degree Celsius. This will completely destroy fisheries. NEERI which wrote reports sitting on the table is completely oblivious of sea level and depth. The sea gets deeper as you move southward from Mumbai. The Maharashtra government has restricted fishing activities up to 10 fathoms which is within 2 km where the hot sea water from reactors will be released. So NEERI has not thought of fisher folk.”